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 Sentiment, Order Imbalance and Co-movement. An Examination of Shocks to Retail and 
Institutional Trading Activity.  
 
 
                                                           ABSTRACT 
Using order flow imbalance as a measure of sentiment we show that positive and negative shocks to 
sentiment captured by the Smooth Transition Conditional Correlation GARCH model (STCC GARCH 
model)  lead to lower co-movement between portfolio and market returns in the post-shock period. We find 
an asymmetry is present as positive shocks to sentiment have less impact on co-movement changes than 
negative shocks. We also find that shocks to retail sentiment and the sentiment of two types of institutional 
investors leads to a reduction in co-movement. Positive shocks to institutional order flow imbalance lead to 
smaller reductions in co-movement than associated with retail shocks. These effects exist even after we 
control for firm specific and market-wide news. 
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Compelling evidence shows that the mood or sentiment of the stock market can play an important role in 
influencing the extent to which individual stock returns co-move with the rest of the market. A pioneering 
paper by Kumar and Lee (2006) suggests that order flow imbalance (buying activity relative to selling 
activity) is a useful measure of sentiment. This connection exists because an optimistic mood encourages 
more buying activity and less selling activity while a pessimistic mood encourages more selling and less 
buying activity. Kumar and Lee (2006) use a measure of order flow imbalance adjusted for common factors 
to capture sentiment and show that sentiment increases co-movement.  
 
A premise of Kumar and Lee (2006) is that market sentiment is captured by the sentiment of retail investors 
because these investors do not have access to the information resources that institutions have so they make 
more irrational investment decisions. However, there is growing evidence to suggest that institutional 
investors also act irrationally and are influenced by sentiment, see for example Brown and Cliff (2005), 
Barberis et al (2005),  Bagnoli et al (2009) and  DeVault, Sias and Starks (2016). Institutional investors 
become sentiment traders because they are influenced by “reputational trading” which encourages institutions 
to trade in the direction of sentiment to avoid their performance standing out from the average while the 
consistent short term predictability of sentiment strategies and the impediments to corrective low cost 
arbitrage cause institutions to take advantage of short term predictability driven by sentiment because it is 
profitable. As a result the order flow of institutional investors reflect sentiment. Moreover, recent analysis of 
the order flow of retail and institutional investors by DeVault, Sias  and Starks (2016) shows that institutions 
are more driven by sentiment than retail investors. We are therefore motivated to extend the analysis of 
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 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for the generosity of their time and comments which have allowed us to improve 
the paper considerably.  
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Kumar and Lee (2006) and consider whether the sentiment of retail and institutional investors can influence 
co-movement.  
 
One of the key results presented in Kumar and Lee (2006) shows that the portfolio returns of small firms is 
positively influenced by the order flow imbalance or sentiment of retail investors. They do not find that there 
is a relationship between the portfolio returns of larger firms and retail sentiment. Large institutional 
investors invest more heavily in large firms while retail investors are more concentrated in small firms.  This 
suggests that for large firms to reflect investor sentiment the measure of sentiment may need to be broadened 
to include institutional sentiment as these investors are more likely to have an influence over large firms. 
Moreover, the results of Kumar and Lee (2006) do not provide direct and conclusive evidence of the 
relationship between sentiment and co-movement only that sentiment influences returns and therefore 
indirectly must influence co-movement.  
 
Using an adaptation of the Lee and Radhakrishna (2000) algorithm we identify the trades associated with 
three types of traders. Small trades are classified as retail trades, medium trades are classified as institutional 
informed trades or stealth trades and the largest trades are classified as large institutional trades. For each of 
these three investor groups we use the traders daily order flow imbalance to capture their sentiment. For each 
type of investor this is measured as a ratio of their dollar value of buyer initiated trades to seller initiated 
trades adjusted for common factors. We also measure the total sentiment of the market using all trades. Over 
the period we examine we find that sentiment to the different investor groups on average across all stocks is 
optimistic but varies over time. 
  
Empirically, we find that firm characteristics are also important in determining sentiment as some firm 
characteristics are associated with average order imbalances greater than unity which suggests greater 
optimistic  sentiment. These characteristics, are firms that are S&P500 index constituents, larger, more liquid, 
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have low book-to-market ratios, have higher prices, are older firms, have higher levels of institutional  
ownership, have lower earnings-to-price ratios and higher earnings growth because on average over time 
buying pressure for these stocks out weighs selling pressure. Large institutional traders on average display 
positive sentiment across all stock characteristics we examine, but have the greatest positive sentiment for 
smaller firms, stocks with low illiquidity and firms with high prices and earnings growth. Retail investors 
have pessimistic sentiment for small stocks, low priced stocks and young stocks but the most positive 
sentiment for high priced stocks, firms with low earnings per share ratios and firms with high earnings 
growth. Stealth traders generally have positive sentiment for each firm characteristic which is especially 
strong for large firms, and stocks with, high prices, high institutional ownership, low EPS and high earnings 
growth.  
 
We calculate the average pairwise correlation between changes in the order flow imbalance of one stock and 
another to identify whether changes to order flow are systematically correlated, an indication that trading 
decisions are coordinated and therefore influenced by sentiment. Our results suggest that changes to the 
overall order flow imbalances across all stocks are not highly correlated but changes amongst retail investors 
appear to be correlated. We also find that firm characteristics influence the average pairwise correlations and 
contribute to higher levels of co-ordination amongst firms with some shared characteristics. Multivariate 
analysis identifies which characteristics have an independent influence over correlations.  
 
We next examine whether the sentiment level of the investor group is related to portfolio excess returns. This 
is similar to some previous analysis undertaken by Kumar and Lee (2006). We extend their analysis by 
regressing portfolio returns in excess of the risk free rate against a set of market factors and the sentiment of 
our distinctive types of investors. We find that total sentiment, retail and large institutional sentiment is 
correlated with portfolio returns even after controlling for market risk factors. This confirms that the 
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sentiment of retail investors influences co-movement but also shows that the sentiment of institutional 
investors matters.  
 
To our knowledge, we are the first paper to comprehensively examine the impact that shocks to sentiment, 
measured as order flow imbalance shocks have on co-movement. The study of shocks rather than levels 
offers a number of advantages. First, shocks capture unanticipated changes in order flow imbalance so reflect 
the element of order flow imbalance or sentiment that represents an innovation or change in behavior so may 
have a different impact on returns and co-movement to order flow imbalance levels. We also show that order 
flow imbalance levels are non-stationary but changes to order flow imbalance are stationary which provides 
an additional motivation to focus on shocks. Within the paper we consider two types of shocks. The first is 
the change in the order flow imbalance level between consecutive periods. This is a useful measure as it 
adequately captures the concept of a shock and can be easily calculated.  
 
Using this concept of shock we estimate the average pairwise correlation between the market excess return 
and changes in sentiment for each of the investor groups. This analysis is similar to some that  Kumar and 
Lee (2006) undertook but we extend their analysis to also include the sentiment of stealth and institutional 
traders. We find that the change in total order flow imbalance and retail order flow imbalance are negatively 
correlated with changes in the market excess return. This suggests that changes in order flow imbalance are 
associated with reduced co-movement and motivates us to examine the impact of order flow shocks on stock 
market correlation further.  
 
A weakness of the analysis undertaken by Kumar and Lee (2006) is that a direct link between co-movement 
and order flow imbalance is not established. This motivates us to examine a second type of shock to order 
flow imbalance which is derived from the Silvennoinen and Teräsvirta (2005) and Berben and Jansen (2005) 
Smooth Transition Conditional Correlation GARCH (STCC GARCH model). Estimation of this model 
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allows us to capture the conditional return correlation between individual portfolio returns and the market 
portfolio in periods prior and subsequent to an order flow imbalance shock. This allows us to establish within 
the confines of the model how sentiment shocks influence conditional correlation and therefore co-
movement. Within this framework we are also able to control for the effects of firm specific and market-wide 
information  on returns and order flow imbalance to ensure we control for the effects of new information on 
pre and post shock estimates of conditional correlation.   
 
A particular advantage of the way shocks are identified in this model, as noted by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) 
and Boyer et al (2008) is that a self-selection bias is avoided because shocks to order flow imbalance are 
identified endogenously. Moreover, the model can capture non-linearities allowing us to examine separately 
within the context of the model how positive and negative shocks influence correlations. This attribute is 
important as Hong, Lim and Stein (2000), Vuolteenaho (2002),  Chan (2003) and  Kothari, Lewellen, and 
Warner (2006)  found that investors respond asymmetrically to good and bad news. Moreover, Gemmill 
(1996), Keim and Madhavan (1996), Conrad, Johnson and Wahal (2001) have all shown that increased 
buying pressure leads to a permanent appreciation in price but an increase in selling pressure does not. This 
suggests that positive and negative changes to sentiment may have diverse effects on correlation. Another 
advantage of the STCC GARCH model is that shocks are only identified as shocks if they are higher than the 
threshold, this makes these shocks less noisy that changes per se as they will not reflect minor variations in 
order flow imbalance.   
 
Our estimation of the smooth transition model provides direct evidence that shocks to order flow imbalance 
lead to a reduction in co-movement as average post shock conditional correlations between portfolios and the 
market are lower than in the pre-shock period.  We find that in general positive shocks (shocks that are 
optimistic) lead to smaller average reductions in post shock conditional correlations than negative shocks 
(shocks that are pessimistic).  We find that when pre-shock sentiment is optimistic positive shocks lead to 
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larger reductions in co-movement than negative shocks but when pre-shock sentiment is already pessimistic 
negative shocks cause larger changes to conditional correlation than positive shocks. We find that positive 
shocks have similar impacts on conditional correlation changes for portfolios that comprise only of S&P500 
index constituents when compared to those drawn from non S&P500 index constituents but negative shocks 
lead to larger changes in conditional correlation for portfolios of non S&P500 constituents. When we 
compare the effects of shocks to the sentiment of the three investor groups we find that shocks to the order 
flow of retail investors lead to greater declines in post shock conditional correlations or co-movement than is 
associated with stealth or large traders. The smallest post shock changes in conditional correlation are 
associated with large institutional investors.  
 
In a final piece of analysis we examine the impact that firm characteristics have on order flow changes. We 
do this to examine whether changes(shocks) to order flow and therefore the sentiment  of different investors 
is influenced by the characteristics of the firm. We find that positive and negative changes to total order flow 
imbalance are only  influenced by earnings per share values and how long a firm has been listed on the 
exchange.  
 
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the literature on how sentiment and 
information influences retail and institutional investors. Section 3 describes in detail the data used. Section 4 
describes some summary statistics and provides some preliminary analysis. Section 5 describes the smooth 
transition model. Section 6 provides the results of the smooth transition model. Section 7 examines the 
relationship between sentiment changes and firm characteristics, Section 8 discusses some sub-period 
analysis and explores the estimation of the smooth transition model over different return horizons. Section 9 
offers some conclusions to the paper.  
 
2. Information, Sentiment and  Institutional and Retail Order Flow. 
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In this section we discuss how information and sentiment influences stock returns. We also explore the 
evidence that seeks to establish whether retail and institutional traders are information or sentiment traders.  
 
2.1 Order Flow Imbalance and Information 
Two distinct theoretical approaches have been developed to describe rational price formation in the market 
microstructure literature and how price changes are connected to order flow. These distinct approaches are 
the Grossman-Stiglitz (1980) noisy rational expectations equilibrium framework (REEF)  and the Baysian-
Nash approach of the Kyle model (1985). In the Grossman-Stiglitz REEF model informed and uninformed 
traders participate in a market for a single security. Informed traders observe a noisy signal about the end of 
period asset value while uninformed traders learn about information from market prices which are 
determined by a convex combination of the demands of the informed and uninformed traders. An implied 
auctioneer sets prices so that overall excess demand and supply is eliminated and the market clears. Within 
this rational expectations framework prices reflect new information conveyed through the order flow. 
  
A distinctive feature of price formation in the Kyle (1985) model is that informed traders can act strategically 
which is not possible within the rational expectations framework. The Kyle model describes a market in 
which noise traders (uninformed traders), informed traders with an information signal and market makers 
(the role of the auctioneer is made explicit through the actions of the market maker) participate. The market 
maker observes the net order flow (difference between submitted buy trades and sell trades) but cannot 
ascertain whether informed  or noise traders  have placed orders. The order flow information is therefore a 
noisy signal of the stock’s value and is used by the market maker to form a conditional expectation of the 
stock’s value. Price changes determined by the market maker are a linear function of the net order flow so 
reflect the perceived information content of the order flow
2
.  
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 More recently, using the Kyle (1985) framework Odders-White and Ready (2008) derive a model which allow the information 
content of the order flow imbalance to be broken down into two types of information i.e. information that is private and 





In the Hasbrouck (1991) VAR model it is shown that signed unexpected order flow (surprise or shock) has a 
large and permanent impact on returns
3
. This suggests that it is the unexpected component of signed order 
flow that leads to price impacts. The role of unexpected changes in order flow imbalance on stock returns is 
also an issue examined by Chordia et al (2015) who finds that both the level and the shock to order flow 




Usually theoretical market microstructure models such as those that we have discussed  document the 
relationship between transaction returns and the order flow at transaction time t. Order flow imbalance 
connects the transaction returns and the net order flow imbalance associated with the transaction to returns 
and order flow measured over a specified interval such as 15 minutes, one hour, one day etc. This is the case 
as the order flow imbalance measured over intervals such as a day is the cumulative net order flow of 
transactions over that interval and the returns over that interval are the cumulative transaction returns for that 
interval. If there is a relationship between transaction returns and order flow within an interval then there 
must be a relationship between the order flow imbalance of the interval and the returns measured over the 
interval.  
 
A range of papers have attempted to gauge the strength of the connection between the level of order flow 
imbalance and stock returns (price impact) although no single measure of order flow imbalance has been 
employed. Blume et al (1989) uses order flow imbalance levels  to show that there is a strong connection 
between order flow imbalance and stock returns during the stock market crash of 1987. Cushing and 
Madhavan (2000) examine order imbalance levels  at the end of the trading day and find that order imbalance 
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 Hasbrouck constructs a bi-variate VAR model to explain transaction  returns and signed transactions (transactions that have a 
minus sign if they were seller initiated but a positive sign if they were buyer initiated).  
4
 Chordia et al (2015) measures the shock to order flow imbalance (measured as buyer initiated shares traded less seller initiated 
shares traded scaled by total number of shares traded and as total buy trades less sell trades scaled by all trades. The standard 
deviation of these constructed measures is then calculated on a monthly basis from daily values. The shock is measured as the 
difference between the month t standard deviation of order flow imbalance and a moving average of the standard deviation of order 
flow imbalance from month t-1.  
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is strongly correlated with the overnight and the next days return. Using a longitudinal sample Chordia and 
Subrahmanyam (2004) show that stock returns in excess of the market return are explained by the stock’s 




2.2 Retail and Institutional Information Trading 
A connection between stock returns and the level of order flow imbalance or changes in order flow 
imbalance for institutional and retail investors has been used to suggest that the order flow of both 
institutions and retail investors contain information. Klemkosky (1977) showed that quarterly institutional 
trading imbalances
6
 are positively associated with contemporaneous abnormal returns. Kraus and Stoll 
(1972) and Mikkelson and Partch (1985) show that block trades initiated by institutional traders lead to 
significant price changes as the market absorbs the change in order flow while Griffin, Harris and Topaloglu 
(2003) find a strong contemporaneous relationship between changes in institutional ownership and daily 
stock returns. Recent evidence that specific types of institutional investors are informed is provided by Ülkü 
and Weber (2013) who shows that the trading activity of investment trusts, securities firms, pension funds 
and merchants lead to price impacts so must contain information. This contrasts with the trading activity of 
private funds and banks which do not contain information.  
 
Although traditionally it is institutional investors that are assumed to be information traders because they 
have economies of scale in information acquisition more recently evidence has emerged to suggest that the 
order flow of retail investors may also contain information about future returns. Kaniel et al (2008) show that 
changes made to the order flow of individual investors is correlated with future short term returns so that the 
most heavily purchased stocks considerably outperform the most heavily sold stocks the following month. 
                                                 
5
 Blume et al (1989) uses as a measure of order flow imbalance the dollar value of buy orders less the dollar value of sell orders, 
Madhavan and Cushing (2000) use buyer initiated volume less seller initiated volume scaled by overall volume. Chordia and 
Subrahmanyam (2004) use the number of buyer initiated trades less the number of seller initiated trades scaled by the number of 
trades as well as the volume of buyer initiated trades less the number of seller initiated trades scaled by volume. 
6
 Klemkosky (1977) uses as a measure of order flow imbalance the difference between the dollar value buying and selling activity 
of  the ten largest trades identified in surveys of investment companies.  
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Kelley and Tetlock (2013) find that the limit and market order imbalances of retail investors are positively 
associated with future returns at horizons of up to 20 days. Moreover, they show that imbalances in market 




2.3 Sentiment and Order Flow 
An alternative view of how returns are connected to order flow is provided by the sentiment view of order 
flow imbalance which suggests that sentiment encourages coordinated trading activity in response to the 
market mood. An optimistic market mood encourages more buying activity and less selling activity 
encouraging an order flow imbalance in favor of buying while a pessimistic mood encourages more selling 
activity and less buying activity and therefore a balance in favor of selling. One of the advantages of 
capturing sentiment in this way is that analysis of order flow shows what investors have actually done 
through their trading rather than trying to predict what they might do from investor surveys or confidence 
indexes. Moreover, the relationship between sentiment indexes and order flow may not be synchronous. 
Order flow imbalance captures when investors actually respond to sentiment changes but a change in 
sentiment does not necessarily lead to changes in trading behavior unless the change in sentiment is believed 
to last. Some changes to sentiment indexes may be transitory which does not motivate investors to change 
their portfolios. The study of order flow imbalance focuses on the components of sentiment that matter.  
 
Shleifer and Vishney (1997) argue that rational arbitragers do not force prices to intrinsic values immediately 
because of impediments to the process of arbitrage caused by trading costs and short selling failures
8
 which 
allows the influence of sentiment to persist.  As a result stock prices can persistently move away from their 
fundamental value and the correlations between order flow and stock returns become inflated. In this context, 
order flow imbalance is a reflection of the optimism or pessimism in the market and does not reflect 
                                                 
7
 Order imbalances are measured by Kelley and Tetlock (2010) as the number of shares bought less the number sold scaled by buys 
and sells. 
8
 Constraints associated with short selling make it impossible to arbitrage away the position of sentiment driven traders. Some 
institutions for example can not take short positions; Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that some institutional arbitragers avoid 
volatile arbitrage positions.  
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information. This link between order flow imbalance and sentiment is exploited by  Kumar and Lee (2006) 
who suggest that the level of order flow imbalance associated with retail investors, the investor group they 
believe best reflects sentiment, will act as an approximation to the amount of sentiment present in the market.  
 
Baker and Wurgler (2007) suggest that sentiment does not affect all stocks equally. A rise in optimistic 
sentiment will cause some investors to reduce their investments in interest bearing securities and accounts 
and invest more heavily in the stock market while some investors will be encouraged to invest in more risky 
stock market investments than they held previously. The effects of these changes should be arbitraged away. 
However, because there are limits to the arbitrage process due to an inability to short sell and because 
arbitrage is costly and not equal across different stocks the effect of sentiment persists and influences stocks 
in an asymmetric way. Stock market characteristics associated with more costly arbitrage are stocks that are 
young, have a short earnings record, have high intangible values, are currently unprofitable but have potential 
for high growth. These characteristics impinge on the valuation process allowing irrational factors such as 
sentiment to have a more pervasive influence on their value. This means that when sentiment is optimistic 
there is a tendency for buying activity in hard to value stocks to rise but selling activity to rise when 
sentiment is pessimistic. This is noted in the work of Antoniou, Doukas and Subrahmanyam (2015) who 
show that when the market is optimistic high beta stocks become overpriced due to the influence of sentiment 
traders causing the security market line to become downward sloping. However, when the market is not 
optimistic less noise trading causes the security market line to be upward sloping.    
 
A second reason why some stocks may respond differently to sentiment is that investors react differently to 
sentiment depending on their habitat preferences which causes them to have a preference for stocks with 
specific characteristics. This will cause asymmetric responses in different stocks when sentiment changes. 
For example, if retail investors have a preference for high liquidity stocks when sentiment rises individual 
investors will alter their investments in favour of stock market investments. However, if retail investors have 
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a preference for low illiquidity securities, when these portfolio adjustments are made a disproportionately 
high amount of the investment will go into low illiquidity stocks. Thus the portfolio adjustments investors 
make in response to sentiment changes will depend upon their natural preferences or habitat.  
As suggested by Barberis et al (2005) a third influence on the extent to which stocks are characterized by 
sentiment is the fraction of ownership held by different investors. This is important because some investors 
may be more likely to succumb to sentiment than others. For example, Kumar and Lee (2006) argue that 
retail investors do not have access to the same resources as institutional investors so high retail ownership 
may be associated with more sentiment motivated trading.  When an investor group such as retail traders 
prefer a stock with particular characteristics so that a given type of investor holds a higher proportion of these 
stocks than other investors it is described as the investors natural habitat. The natural habitat of an investor 
can influence the level of sentiment if the type of investor associated with a habitat is less effective at 
arbitraging away inefficiencies.  
 
2.4 Sentiment Trading by Retail and Institutional Investors 
There is evidence to believe that both retail and institutional investors are influenced by sentiment. Although 
Kelley and Tetlock (2013) showed that the trading activity of retail investors predict short term returns over 
longer horizons individual investors have also been shown to underperform the market, an indication their 
trading is influenced by sentiment. For example, Odean (1999) finds that stocks bought by individuals 
underperform stocks sold by individuals over a twelve month horizon while Hvidkjaer (2008) shows that for 
small and medium sized firms the underperformance of purchases persists for up to three years
9
. Barber, 
Odean and Zhu (2008) show that retail purchases (sales) earn higher (lower) returns the following week but 
over a one year horizon purchases underperform sales. Barberis et al (2008) develop a model which explains 
these short run and long inconsistencies. They show that in the short run the buying activity of investors 
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 Hvidkjaer (2008) shows that volume from small trades to examine the relationship between retail investor trading behaviour and 
the cross-section of future stock returns and finds that stocks with the most seller-initiated small trade volume, measured over the 
previous several months, outperform stocks with the greatest buyer initiated small-trade volume. This return difference accrues 
during the first month and continues for two years but continues for three years among small and medium sized firms.  
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provides higher returns than sales because in the short run the effects of sentiment causes momentum but 
over longer periods markets adjust leading to return reversals and underperformance of purchases relative to 
sales.  
 
Institutional investors also appear to be influenced by sentiment. Institutional investors represent a broad 
group and include diverse institutions such as hedge funds, pension funds, mutual funds as well as banks and 
insurance companies as well as independent investment advisors. One cause of institutional sentiment trading 
stems from reputational effects such as those discussed by Scharfstein and Stein (1990) who argue that 
institutional trading behavior is co-ordinated because one investment manager will not wish to behave very 
differently from another as they will not wish their performance to stand out
10
. In their model they show that 
managers will trade in the same direction as other managers even if they have opposing fundamental 
information rather than risk their reputation by performing below average. The use of sentiment allows 
managers to perform close to the average so that their performance does not stand out. Graham (1999) shows 
that when analysts have a high reputation in the industry, have low ability or if public information contradicts 
their private information analysts will prefer to trade in the same direction as other analysts rather than risk 
standing out from the crowd and being wrong.  
 
Institutional investors invest on behalf of their clients and many of these will be individuals and smaller 
investors. Typically, institutional investors work to maintain their client base and prevent them from moving 
to rival institutions. If clients are themselves influenced by sentiment and the manager does not follow an 
investment strategy based on sentiment the manager may face declining revenue or have their position 
terminated by their underlying clients who are influenced by sentiment. These reputational effects cause 
institutional traders to employ sentiment.  
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 The idea is that  if a fund manager does not use sentiment and their performance is below that of other fund managers they will 
stand out as underperforming managers even if they sometimes perform better than other managers. The strategy for fund managers 





Another reason why some institutions may adopt sentiment based trading is that in some circumstances it 
may be rational. We know that noise trading such as that induced by sentiment is positively correlated with 
short term returns as discussed above. This suggests that institutional investors that trade for short term gains 
are likely to benefit from trading on retail sentiment even when they are not exposed to reputational effects 
from their clients. They trade on sentiment because it is profitable to do so. Even if they wish to arbitrage 
away the predictability due to sentiment they are unable to because of the limits to implementing cost 
effective arbitrage strategies. As a result it is more profitable to trade on sentiment than arbitrage against the 
sentiment. Evidence of “riding the bubble” is provided by Brunnermeier and Nagal (2004) who examine the 
trading behavior of hedge funds during the technology bubble of 2000. They find that hedge funds were 
heavily invested in technology stocks rather than being a correcting force and arbitraging out of technology 
stocks. Griffin et al (2011) also examined trading patterns during the technology bubble but for a range of 
different institutions. They found that mutual funds and independent investment advisors as well as hedge 
funds invested even more heavily in technology stocks than retail investors during the bubble but divested at 
the point stock values began to decline unlike retail investors who continued investing even after institutional 
investors had shifted their positions. This suggests using sentiment can be profitable.  
 
Further, evidence of sentiment influencing institutional investors is provided by Brown and Cliff (2005) who 
use survey data from “Investor’s Intelligence” to track the number of bullish or bearish newsletters. Using 
this as a proxy for sentiment they find that during periods of optimistic sentiment stocks are overpriced. 
Bagnoli et al (2009) shows that institutional investors exhibit sentiment by documenting that analysts make 
more favorable recommendations when market sentiment is also favorable. Moreover, DeVault et al (2016) 
finds that it is the behavior of institutional investors that drives the relationship between stock returns and 
sentiment not retail investors. They also find that when market sentiment is optimistic institutional investors 
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hold higher concentrations of speculative or hard to value stocks an indication that the behavior of 
institutions is influenced by sentiment.  
 
2.5 Information, Sentiment and Co-movement 
As we showed earlier changes in order flow can arise for two reasons, the arrival of new information or 
changes in sentiment. New information can be market-wide or firm specific. Roll (1988) argues that price 
impacts such as those described by Kyle (1985) are primarily caused by the arrival of new firm specific 
information  which causes return correlation between stocks to be low as return variations are primarily firm 
specific and not shared by other firms. The arrival of new firm specific information will reduce return 
correlation amongst securities  as firm specific factors exert a stronger influence over returns reducing the 
extent to which firm returns covary with the market. The arrival of new market-wide information will 
increase return correlation between stocks and the market as the effects of this news will influence stocks in 
general and therefore introduce common factors.  
 
Sentiment increases co-movement as optimistic or pessimistic moods cause investors to undertake 
coordinated  buying or selling activity which raises co-movement. Evidence exists that both retail investors 
and institutional investors contribute to co-movement as a result of sentiment. Barberis, Schleifer and 
Wurgler (2005) find that entry into the S&P500 index leads to an increase in beta for firms newly indexed 
which indicates that their co-movement with other indexed firms rises. They argue that since index entry has 
a neutral effect on fundamentals the observed rise in co-movement must be due to a rise in sentiment. They 
argue that this sentiment must be related to institutional sentiment because stock holdings of S&P500 index 
constituents are concentrated within the portfolios of institutional investors.  
 
 For retail investors Lee, Shleifer and Thaler (1991) find that the returns of stocks with low levels of 





. Dorn et al (2008) show that the brokerage trading records of individual investors 
are correlated.  Kumar and Lee (2006) show that buying activity of retail investors within low capitalization 
stocks is positively correlated with the buying activity in other small stocks and that the buying activity of 
one individual investor is correlated with the buying activity of other individual investors. This shows that 
the trading decisions of retail investors are coordinated. They also find that when stock holdings reflect 
higher concentrations of retail investment there are higher levels of order flow imbalance and sentiment and 
therefore higher levels of co-movement. 
 
3. Data 
We construct a sample of all NYSE/AMEX ordinary common stocks listed on the CRSP/COMPUSTAT 
merged database between the period January 1993 and December 2011
12
. From CRSP/COMPUSTAT, we 
extract daily security price and shares outstanding information along with CRSP value weighted market 
returns, volume information and data on firm characteristics. 
  
3.1 Defining Buyer and Seller Initiated Trades 
There is no single database or construction method that has been used to capture order flow imbalance. In 
this section we describe the method we use and why. From the Trades and Quotes (TAQ) database we obtain 
tick-by-tick data for NYSE/AMEX stocks. Using this information we identify buyer or seller initiated trades 
by applying the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm which Lee and Radhakrishna (2000) show is highly 
accurate at separating buyer and seller initiated trades in equity markets. This algorithm has been used 
extensively in previous studies to capture order flow information, see for example Chordia et al (2002), 
Barberis et al (2005), Harford and Kaul (2005) or Barber, Odean and Zhu (2008).   
 
                                                 
11
 They show this through the analysis of closed-end fund discounts. They show that closed-end funds and small stocks tend to be 
held by individual investors, and that the discounts on closed-end funds narrow when small stocks do well.  
12
 We begin in 1993 to coincide with availability of data on the TAQ database. Ordinary common stocks are identified using the 
CRSP share codes 10 and 11. This sample reflects a much longer sample than is usually studied by work that examines the 
influence of order flow.  
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Application of the algorithm requires comparison of transaction price to the contemporaneous quotes of the 
stock to ascertain whether a buyer or seller initiated trade has taken place. Seller initiated trades are those that 
take place below the mid-point price while buyer initiated trades take place above the mid-point price. In 
cases where this trade-quote comparison cannot be undertaken, the algorithm classifies buy trades as those 
that take place on an uptick and sells as those that take place on a downtick. Some trades such as those that 
take place during auctions cannot be classified. On average, each month, there are about five million trades 
associated with sample stocks. Using all intraday assignable trades, we calculate the aggregate dollar value of 
buyer initiated and seller initiated trades each day associated with each stock. The dollar value of all buyer 
initiated trades as a ratio to the dollar value of all seller initiated trades associated with a given stock each day 
is a measure of the total order flow imbalance level.  
 
The ratio we employ has the advantage of automatically scaling the absolute size of the order flow to ensure 
it is the order flow imbalance rather than the absolute dollar value of order flow that is the focus of our 
investigations
13
. This is an important feature because small firms on average will naturally have less 
transactions and transactions of a smaller dollar value than large firms. The ratio is therefore similar but not 
identical to that used by Kumar and Lee (2006) who calculate the ratio of dollar value buy trades minus the 
dollar value of sell trades and scale by the value of total buys and sells 
14
.   
 
3.2 Defining Trader Types 
To partition retail and institutional trades we analyse each trade on TAQ and classify the trade using the Lee 
and Radhakrishna (2000) algorithm who show that trades below $2,500 are retail while those above $20,000 
are institutional. Barber, Odean and Zhu (2009)  provide evidence to show that the algorithm is efficient at 
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 When order flow is large buys are likely to be large and so are sells while when order flow is small buys and sells are likely to be 
small. This means the ratio of buys to sells is scaled.  
14















where VB and VS are the dollar volume of 
buying and selling activity on day t calculated from trades 1 to N on day t. This is modified here as we construct and utilise ratios 
based on a daily frequency rather than a monthly.   
19 
 
identifying retail trades as they find that brokerage trades from retail investors are highly correlated with 
trades below the lowest cut-off. We calculate the daily order-flow imbalance level associated with retail 
trades by calculating the aggregate dollar value of buyer initiated trades to the aggregate dollar value of seller 
initiated trades using trades below the smallest cut-off.  
 
There are likely to be two types of institutional traders active in the market, those that are informed and those 
that are uninformed. As shown by strategic trader models such as those of Easley and O’Hara (1987) 
institutional traders that are informed are likely to trade smaller quantities than preferred to disguise that they 
are informed. Empirical evidence of such  “stealth trading” by informed institutional traders is provided by 
Barclay and Warner (1992) and Chakravarty (2001) who show that medium sized trades move prices more 
than any other trade size indicating they contain higher levels of information. Those initiating the very largest 
trades are likely to be uninformed institutional traders  as they make no attempt to disguise their trading 
activity. Moreover, the recent study of Ülkü and Weber (2013) showed that some institutions can be 
informed while others can be uninformed which suggests that institutional trades are not necessarily a 
homogeneous group.  
 
We calculate the order flow imbalance for large institutional traders as the ratio of aggregate dollar value of 
buyer initiated trades to the aggregate dollar value of seller initiated trades above the largest cut-off size. 
Trades between the smallest and largest cut-offs we designate as being from stealth traders as they will 
reflect the trades of institutions that are more likely to be informed. We calculate the order flow imbalance 
ratio of stealth traders as the daily aggregate dollar value of buyer initiated trades to the aggregate dollar 





Kumar and Lee (2006) calculate their retail order imbalance ratios from buying and selling activity 
undertaken at a large U.S brokerage house over the period 1991-1996 which allows them to definitively 
assign trades as retail. Our use of TAQ data rather than brokerage reports or 13-F filings which are also 
sometimes used to calculate order imbalances (see for example Campbell et al (2009)) offers a range of 
advantages. TAQ data records all trades undertaken on NYSE/AMEX so our sample of retail investor trades 
is more representative of retail activity than a brokerage report from one firm. As noted by Kumar and Lee 
(2006) for some stocks thin trading was a problem which caused their order imbalance ratios to be noisy but 
with the wider range of trades captured by TAQ thin trading is not an issue of concern. The quantity of 
information available from TAQ data also allows us to study a longer time horizon than is usually possible or 
available from brokerage reports. Moreover, in some of the analysis we undertake we wish to study order 
flow over relatively short intervals. 13-F filings only facilitate an analysis over a quarterly interval period and 
are therefore not suitable for this analysis. As noted by Barberis et al (2005) 13-F filings do not offer a 
comprehensive  coverage of investors as wealthy individuals and small institutions do not file 13-Fs. Finally, 
the analysis of investor holdings and brokerage reports does not provide information about who initiates a 
trade only that a trade or a change in holdings takes place. Sentiment is likely to be more closely associated 
with the party that initiates a trade which provides an advantage to using TAQ data and applying the Lee-
Ready algorithm.  
 
In 2001 decimalisation of quotations took place which  reduced trading costs and increased volume, see for 
example Bessembinder (2003). Some of this increase in volume was from high frequency trading although a 
2014 congressional report suggests that after 2008 high frequency trading has declined substantially. High 
frequency trades are often small which causes these institutional trades to be incorrectly assigned as retail 
using the Lee-Radhakrishna algorithm. We recognise this as a possible problem of partitioning by trader 
type. However, the effect of such errors in the assignment of trades on the order imbalance ratios we use 
should be minimal. A high frequency trader that initiates a buy(sell) trade will tend to offset that trade before 
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the end of the trading day causing their end of day position to be neutral irrespective of how large the within 
day order flow imbalance of the high frequency trader was(see for example, Menkveld (2011) in particular 
Figure 5 or Broggard et al (2014)). This means that when we calculate the order flow imbalance for the day 
the effect of small trades from high frequency traders will be minimal.  
 
From the constructed order imbalance ratio of each firm and each investor group we extract the influence of 
common-factors due to market-wide effects by regressing against the order imbalance ratio of firm i on day t  
the market excess return of that day. This allows us to extract the effect of market-wide news which has the 
potential to introduce a common factor which could mimic the effects of sentiment. The residuals from this 
regression contain the isolated sentiment component and form the basis of our measure of sentiment for firm 
i used in our later analysis. We call order flow imbalance/sentiment  obtained across all trades total-OFIL, 
our retail constructed order flow imbalance and sentiment we call retail-OFIL, stealth and large trade 
constructed measures we call  stealth-OFIL, and large-OFIL respectively.  A value above unity for this ratio 
implies an excess of buying pressure and therefore optimistic sentiment while a value below unity implies an 
excess of selling pressure and thus pessimistic sentiment. The partitioning of trades from different investors 
allows us to determine whether the sentiment of institutional investors is different from each other and 
different to that of retail investors.  
 
3.3 Stock Characteristics and Risk Measures 
We employ a range of stock characteristics in our analysis which Baker and Wurgler (2007) noted as being 
possible features of stocks that are hard to value and more costly to arbitrage or by Barberis (2005)  as 
possible investor habitats.  Firm size (SIZE) is the market value of the firm ( share price x number of shares 
issued) and has been identified as a characteristic of hard to value stocks due to a paucity of information, see 
for example Arbel and Strebel (1982). Smaller stocks are also more expensive to undertake arbitrage with 
because trading costs tend to be higher.  Moreover, size was identified as a possible investor habitat by 
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Barberis et al  (2005). Illiquidity also makes firms more difficult to value and more expensive to arbitrage. To 
capture illiquidity we utilise the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio (ILLIQ) which is calculated as the absolute 
return to volume ratio scaled by the market illiquidity ratio and captures the price impact of one unit of 
volume
15
. D’Avolio (2002) finds that approximately 10% of stocks are never short sold so are not arbitraged. 
These stocks tend to be  small and illiquid stocks. The book-to market ratio (B/M) is included because a high 
book to market ratio can be an indicator of distress which makes these stocks more difficult to value and 
more expensive to arbitrage.  
 
Evidence of higher costs of arbitrage for these firms is provided by Geczy et al (2002) who finds that the cost 
of short selling stocks with low book to market was five times higher than the costs of short selling stocks 
with high book to market. Moreover, distressed stocks is a preferred habitat for some investors but a habitat 
other investors avoid. We include price (PRICE) as the logarithmic value of the firms closing share price as 
low share prices can be a symptom of distress making firms difficult to value and arbitrage. Age (AGE) is the 
number of years a firm has been listed on the exchange. As noted by Baker and Wurgler (2007) younger 
firms have a shorter history of performance so they may be difficult to value because there is a higher level of 
uncertainty associated with them.  The correlation with the market (CM) is the daily correlation in stock 
returns between firm i and the market.  Institutional investors tend to have a preference for firms highly 
correlated with the market such as S&P500 index constituents. While D’Avolio (2002) shows that S&P500 
index constituents can be used as collateral for short selling activity indicating they are easy arbitrage. A high 
level of correlation with the market also makes stocks easier to arbitrage and value as a greater component of 
their valuation can be referenced from other sources i.e. the market return.  
 
Intangibles (INT) represent the proportion of intangible assets the firm reports as a ratio to overall assets and 
represents the component of firms assets that are most difficult to value. Therefore firms with higher levels of 
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 To be precise this measure is also scaled by 10
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intangibles become more difficult to value as overall firm value contains a greater amount of uncertainty.  
Earnings per share (EPS) is the total earnings of a firm divided by the number of shares issued. The value of 
firms with low or negative earnings have more uncertain future values especially if this is combined with 
other characteristics that make firms hard to value. Earnings growth(EG), which is the return on equity 
(ROE) multiplied by one minus the dividend pay-out ratio, may also be associated with firms that are hard to 
value. Firms with high earnings growth are more difficult to value as the range of future growth rates are 
likely to be more dispersed. We also utilise the proportion of share ownership (OWN) held by institutional 
investors which we obtain from Thomson Reuters 13-F filings This is the total institutional ownership as a 
percentage of shares outstanding. Ownership is important as it identifies whether a firm is held more 
aggressively by retail or institutional investors which identifies whether the stock is a habitat of retail or 
institutional investors.  Furthermore D’Avolio (2002) shows that firms with high institutional ownership are 
cheaper to arbitrage.  
 
The market return Rm is the return to the equal weighted market return provided by CRSP. The risk free rate 
is the return to a US treasury bill (Rf). The SMB, HML and UMD factors are obtained from Ken French’s 
website and refer respectively to the return on a portfolio of small firms minus the return to a portfolio of 
large firms, the return to high book-to-market firms minus the return to low book to market firms, the return 
of the highest performing portfolio minus the return of the lowest performing portfolio measured over the 
previous six months. Macroeconomic variables that we use are all obtained from Compustat, these are 
described later.  
 
4. Summary Statistics 
In this section we examine the sentiment levels of different types of investors across the market as a whole 
and for firms organised into groups on the basis of firm characteristics. We also provide some preliminary 
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evidence of how changes to order flow imbalance, an initial measure of shock, influences co-movement. The 
role of this section is to motivate the analysis we undertake using the STCC GARCH model later.  
 
4.1 Sentiment Levels 
We begin by reporting the average daily order-imbalance level (OFIL) across individual stocks as this forms 
the basis of our measurement of sentiment. Since we have already extracted common factors due to market 
news, if sentiment is neutral, on average OFIL will be close to unity (over time and across stocks firm 
specific news is diversified away). However, if optimistic sentiment exists on average OFIL will be >1, but if 
average sentiment is pessimistic OFIL will be <1
16
. We calculate the correlation coefficient between our 
different investor sentiment measures and the Baker-Wurgler (2006) sentiment index which has become the 
primary sentiment metric (see for example, Antoniou, Doukas and Subrahmanyam (2013), Stambaugh, Yu 
and Yuan (2012a, 2012b)). We find that Total-OFIL, the measure of overall sentiment and the Baker-
Wurgler index has a correlation value of 0.294(p value 0.00). Retail investor sentiment has a correlation of 
0.255(p value 0.00), stealth investor sentiment has a correlation of 0.188(p value 0.00) and large investor 
sentiment a correlation of 0.087 (p value is 0.02). We would not necessarily expect the correlation between 
different sentiment measures to be very high. DeVault et al (2016) for example, find that the correlation 
between the Baker-Wurgler index and the measure of consumer confidence, an alternative measure of 
sentiment, is on average about 20%. Moreover, changes in sentiment, as measured by an index may take 
some time to lead to actual changes in trading behavior which would lead to a lack of synchronicity between 
order flow changes and changes in sentiment when recorded through a sentiment index. 
 
In Figure 1 Panel A to D we trace out the average level of sentiment (OFIL) for each investor group each day 
during the sample period to show how sentiment levels of each investor group fluctuates over time. Panel A 
shows that average total sentiment has no trend movements until about 2000, increased steadily until about 
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 Order-flow imbalance levels will be influenced by positive and negative news but on average should reflect the stochastic nature 
of information arrival. Although market-wide news should also arrive randomly so that the effect of good news on order flow one 
day is cancelled by bad news another day it is possible that some residual market-wide news effects exist.   
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2005 then declined slightly until 2007. During 2007 there was a steep decline in sentiment which was not 
reversed by the end of the sample period. Similar trends are observable for retail, stealth and large OFIL 
except that the decline in sentiment after 2007 is most pronounced for large-OFIL and least pronounced in 
retail-OFIL. The decline in sentiment during 2007, most evident for stealth and institutional trading reflects 
the start of the financial crisis. During 2007 the banking sector faced a “credit crunch” as subprime 
mortgages began to default and securities linked to their value began to decline in value. As banks began to 
realise these losses interbank lending, an important source of liquidity for the financial system, declined 
substantially. This led to a less favourable outlook and therefore a reduction in sentiment.   
 
Panel A of Table 1 provides average daily sentiment levels for the full sample of stocks and for broad sub-
samples based on whether or not firms are S&P500 index constituents. This partition is motivated by Harford 
and Kaul (2005) who showed that indexing leads to higher correlations between the order flow of one firm 
and another and by Barberis et al (2005) who showed that indexing is associated with sentiment
17
. We also 
partition according to whether OFIL on that day was >1 or <1. This allows us to examine separately firms 
characterized by optimistic and pessimistic sentiment. The average value of total-OFIL across all stocks is 
slightly positive (1.053) which is consistent with positive sentiment. The average retail-OFIL is 1.039, the 
stealth-OFIL is 1.047 and the large-OFIL is 1.133. This suggests that large traders have on average the 
greatest positive sentiment and retail investors the least.    
 
For S&P500 index constituents the total average imbalance is 1.158, 1.028 for retail investors, 1.077 for 
stealth traders and 1.204 for large traders. This shows that large institutional traders have the most positive 
sentiment but retail investors have the least. For non S&P500 index constituents average OFIL values are 
                                                 
17
 Harford and Kaul (2005) use principal components analysis on order flow and returns to show that a principal component which 
reflects indexing is almost perfectly correlated with the returns and order flow for of S&P500 index constituents. Some investors 
who switch into equity from less risky investments because sentiment has increased will invest heavily in stocks which are 
constituents of an index or may even invest in an index product. This happens because some investors select products that they are 
more familiar with and avoid investments that are less well reported in the financial press.  
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generally smaller and closer to unity, although even amongst these stocks the sentiment displayed by large 
institutional traders appears elevated. 
 
When we split the sample according to whether the OFIL ratio of firms is >1 or <1 on day t  we find that 
total-OFIL is 1.585 when the ratio >1 but 0.636 when the ratio is <1. This partitioning also reveals large 
differences between OFIL averages across the different investor groups. Large-OFIL displays the greatest 
imbalance in favour of buying pressure
18
 when the OFIL ratio is >1 (large-OFIL is 1.815) and also displays 
the largest imbalance in favour of selling pressure when the ratio is <1(large-OFIL is 0.588). Stealth traders 
display the smallest average imbalances (1.427 when OFIL >1 and 0.702<1). Retail investors have an 
average OFIL of 1.509 when the ratio is >1 but a ratio of 0.665 when retail-OFIL is >1.   
 
Although our results show that large institutional traders exhibit more positive sentiment than retail traders 
this does not necessarily imply that retail investors are less prone to sentiment. If retail investors have 
positive sentiment for some stocks but negative sentiment for others there may still be high levels of 
sentiment present which does not manifest itself in average retail-OFIL values because positive sentiment in 
one stock is being offset by pessimistic sentiment in another.  
 
To determine whether sentiment levels may be dependent on the characteristic of a security Panel B provides 
OFIL information for groups of stocks which are sorted by a range of stock characteristics  linked to 
sentiment. Panel B shows there are large differences in the average values of OFIL both across the trader  
groups and across the different stock categories. For example, the average total-OFIL is 0.9038 for the small 
firm quintile but 1.1224 for the large firm quintile suggesting positive sentiment for large firms and negative 
sentiment for small firms. Positive sentiment is also associated with firms that have low illiquidity, low book 
to market, high prices, older ages, higher institutional ownership, higher intangibles, a lower EPS, and higher 
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 Although large institutional traders will trade the largest dollar volumes each day their order flow imbalance over time and 
across different stocks should on average equate. Larger dollar volume trades should not necessarily be associated with larger 
dollar imbalances over time and across stocks.  
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earnings growth. While pessimistic sentiment is displayed by firms with high illiquidity, low prices, young 
ages, low institutional ownership.  The disparity in total-OFIL or sentiment levels across stocks with different 
characteristics suggests that these characteristics have an important influence over the overall sentiment 
displayed.  
 
We also find that the sentiment level displayed by each investor group is influenced by firm characteristics. 
Retail traders display higher levels of positive sentiment for larger firms, low book-to-market stocks, high 
price stocks, older stocks, firms with higher levels of institutional ownership, lower EPS and higher earnings 
growth. Pessimistic sentiment is displayed by retail investors for small stocks, low priced stocks and young 
stocks. Stealth traders display positive sentiment for larger stocks, low illiquidity stocks, low book-to market 
stocks, high price stocks, stocks with high  institutional ownership, low EPS values and high earnings 
growth. However, negative sentiment is displayed by stealth traders when stocks have a low price. Large 
traders display the greatest amount of positive sentiment as average OFIL levels in each group are positive 
but the most positive sentiment is displayed within the groups containing small stocks, liquid stocks, low 
book-to-market and stocks with high prices, older stocks, stocks with high  institutional ownership, high 
intangibles, low EPS and high earnings growth. This suggests that the firm characteristics influence the 
sentiment of each type of investor and that average retail-OFIL values are on average lower because positive 
sentiment in some stocks is being offset by negative sentiment in other stocks. 
 
4.2 Sentiment Correlation among Investors 
We next measure the correlation between the change in the OFIL  (we refer to the change in OFIL as D-
OFIL)  of stock i and stock j.  Since we have controlled for market-wide  news effects and because good and 
bad news arrives randomly the buying and selling activity of one stock and another should be uncorrelated. 
However, if variations in OFIL are due to sentiment shocks then changes in buying and selling activity will 
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be influenced by a factor common to all stocks in the sample which raises the correlation in D-OFIL amongst 
stocks.  
 
As shown by Dorn et al (2008) the trading activity of retail investors does not appear to be random which 
suggests that sentiment must also be influencing the buying and selling activity of retail investors in different 
stocks. Our analysis broadens this debate by examining whether the co-ordination of trading behavior across 
different stocks is also influenced by the investor group.  
 
Panel A of Table 2 presents average pairwise correlations across all stocks and for sub-samples and shows 
that the average pairwise correlation between the total D-OFIL of stocks is 3.8% which does not suggest that 
total D-OFIL across stocks is correlated. Average total D-OFIL pairwise correlations are also low for the 
S&P500 constituents (1.6%) and non S&P500 constituents (4.9%). We do not find that indexing per se leads 
to higher correlations in the total D-OFIL of one firm and another if firms are already in the S&P500 index
19
. 
Average pairwise total D-OFIL correlations of firms is 5.2% if the total-OFIL is >1. Only when total-OFIL is  
<1  does the average correlation between the total D-OFIL of firms appear to be elevated (18.5%). This 
indicates greater correlation in trading activity across stocks when total-OFIL is <1 and sentiment is 
pessimistic.  
 
The average pairwise retail D-OFIL correlation across all stocks is 9.5% and therefore the highest of the three 
investor groups. This indicates retail trading activity across different stocks is more coordinated than is 
evident for both types of institutional traders since the average pairwise correlation in D-OFIL across stocks 
is only 5.6% for stealth traders and 5.3% for large institutional traders. The average retail D-OFIL pairwise 
correlations are also higher than for institutional investors when stocks are partitioned according to whether 
stocks are S&P500 constituents or non S&P500 constituents and when they are partitioned according to 
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 The prior removal of the market factor is likely to account for this. 
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whether investor OFIL is >1 or <1.  It is also noticeable that although retail D-OFIL correlations are always 
larger, the D-OFIL correlations of large institutional traders are also elevated if stocks are S&P500 
constituents (13.6%) and elevated for stealth traders if stocks are non S&P500 constituents (7.1%).  
 
Panel B of Table 2 presents average pairwise  D-OFIL correlations calculated between stock i and j within 
groups partitioned by firm characteristics. Average pairwise total D-OFIL correlations are positive but  vary 
according to the firm characteristics. The highest average pairwise correlations are associated with firms in 
the youngest age group (14.47%) and the group containing the smallest firms (8.09%). This suggests that 
there is greater co-ordination in the trading activity of firms within some specific groups than there is across 
all firms in general showing that the degree of co-ordination in trading activity is influenced by firm 
characteristics.  
 
Firm characteristics also influence the size of  correlations for the different investor groups. Moreover, in 
some cases there is a relationship between the size of the correlations and the size of the firm characteristics.   
For example, average retail D-OFIL pairwise correlations are elevated for all firm size groups but rise almost 
monotonically as firms get larger (average correlations are 8.73%  for small firms but 20.09%  for large 
firms). The influence of firm size on the magnitude of average correlations is also apparent for stealth and 
large institutional investors. For both groups their average D-OFIL correlations are higher for small firms 
than for large firms. D-OFIL correlations amongst the small firm group are 15.39% for stealth traders and 
41.40% for large institutional traders.   
 
For retail investors the D-OFIL correlations are elevated and seem associated with the size of the 
characteristic when firms have higher levels of institutional ownership, when firms have larger intangible 
values and  lower EPS values. For stealth traders illiquidity, higher book-to market ratios, high price, young 
age, lower intangibles, higher EPS values and lower earnings growth raise the D-OFIL correlations. For large 
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traders high illiquidity, high book-to-market, high price, a young age, high correlation with the market, raise 
D-OFIL correlations. 
 
We next undertake some multivariate analysis. From the stocks in our sample we form portfolios containing 
randomly assigned securities. Each portfolio contains twenty stocks which will be enough to diversify the 
effects of firm specific information but also allow for cross-sectional variation in OFIL measures. We then 
calculate the correlation between firm i’s D-OFIL and the market D-OFIL for each stock within a portfolio. 
Using these values we create the average of these correlations for portfolio p.  We regress against each 
portfolio correlation the average firm characteristic of each portfolio. This allows us to examine whether 
characteristics contribute to portfolio correlation. The results are presented in Panel C of Table 2 and show 
that some firm characteristics influence correlations. The results for Total-D-OFIL indicate that the 
correlations are positively influenced by firm size, intangibles and return correlation with the market but 
negatively influenced by illiquidity, age and ownership. The correlations from retail investors are influenced 
positively by their return correlation with the market and  firm age and negatively related to illiquidity. The 
correlations for stealth investors are positively related to the extent returns are correlated with the market, 
ownership and the average order imbalance. The correlations calculated for large investors are positively 
related to size and the average order imbalance and negatively related to the return correlation of a firm with 
the market. We do not find that S&P membership influences correlation for any investor group. Overall the 
results show that firm characteristics influence correlation but not in a homogeneous way across investors.  
 
4.3 Multifactor Time-Series Models 
Kumar and Lee (2006)  regress the returns of portfolios in excess of the risk free return (portfolios are formed 
on the basis of firm size to form five size based groups) against their order flow imbalance measure and risk 
factors which control for market-wide effects that can introduce common factors. A positive relationship 
between sentiment  and returns would suggest that more positive sentiment leads to higher portfolio returns 
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and therefore higher co-movement.  Kumar and Lee (2006) found that the sentiment of small investors was 
associated with the portfolio returns of small firms but there was no relationship between  sentiment and the 
returns of large firms. We extend their analysis by estimating equation (1) which allows us to determine 
whether the sentiment of different types of traders influence returns.  
 
Rpt-Rft=α+ β1(Rmt-Rft)+β2SMBt + β3HMLt + β4UMDt + β5OFILpt +ξpt                                                     (1) 
 
Where, Rpt is the return to the randomly created portfolio p. In the analysis we use we do not create portfolios 
formed by firm size as in Kumar and Lee (2006) because this favors  finding a relationship between small 
firms and retail investor sentiment as retail investors are more heavily concentrated in small firms. To ensure 
our portfolios are able to reflect the sentiment of each of our different investor groups we form portfolios by 
randomly combining stocks to form equal-weighted portfolios. Rft is the return to the risk free rate. Risk 
measures are as previously defined. With the inclusion of the Fama-French systematic factors and the use of 
portfolio returns the effect of both firm specific and additional market-wide news effects are controlled for. 
In the Kumar and Lee (2006) analysis  the effect of institutional sentiment on co-movement is not considered. 
To show how the sentiment of different investors influences returns we estimate different versions of 
equation (1) so that each version includes the OFIL of the different investors. Each regression contains either 
Total, Retail, Stealth or Large OFIL and one version contains Retail, Stealth and Large OFIL in the same 
regression. Across the different regressions we can determine how the isolated sentiment of each investor 
group influences co-movement. ξpt is the residual return. We use monthly interval analysis to compare our 
results more clearly with those of Kumar and Lee (2006).   
  
The results of this estimation are provided in Panel A of Table 3 and show that Total-OFIL is positively 
related to excess stock returns showing that this measure of sentiment influences  returns and therefore co-
movement.  However, as well as total market sentiment having an influence over portfolio excess returns we 
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also find that both retail stealth and large institutional OFIL are positively related to portfolio returns when 
these measures of sentiment are included in the regression separately. This suggests that sentiment levels of 
these investors appear to raise co-movement. The regression which includes Retail, Stealth and Large OFIL 
shows that only Retail and Large OFIL are positively correlated with returns. Stealth OFIL is no longer 
significant suggesting that the influence of sentiment associated with Stealth investors if fully captured by 
Retail and Large investor sentiment as we do not find that the OFIL of stealth traders has any independent 
influence on portfolio returns.  
 
4.4 Correlation, Order Flow Imbalance and Excess Market Return 
We next calculate the correlation between the daily change in the order flow imbalance level D-OFIL of 
portfolio p and the market excess return Rm-Rf. We use the change in order flow imbalance (D-OFIL) as a 
measure of sentiment shock associated with portfolio p. The correlation between sentiment shocks and Rm-Rf 
allow us to examine how shocks affect co-movement on average. Kumar and Lee (2006) show that changes 
to their order imbalance measure is negatively associated with market returns (Table III Panel B, p2466) but 
do not discuss this result in any depth. This is an important result as it suggests that shocks or surprises to 
sentiment reduce co-movement so requires further examination. 
  
We extend this analysis by calculating the average pairwise correlation between the excess market return Rm-
Rf and the D-OFIL of portfolio p calculated for each of the investor groups on day t. Average pairwise 
correlations are presented in Table 3 Panel B, and shows that there is on average a negative correlation 
between total D-OFIL and the market excess return. We also find that there is a negative association between 
retail D-OFIL and the market excess return suggesting that changes in the OFIL of retail investors reduces 
co-movement. The D-OFIL of  stealth and large institutional investors is not significantly correlated with 
changes in market excess returns. This is consistent with the changes to OFIL of these investors not 




4.5 Non-Stationarity of Order Flow Levels 
An important reason for studying the impact of order-flow shocks is that order flow imbalances are likely to 
contain a non-stationary component. Schmeling (2007) found that sentiment indexes are non-stationary and 
whilst we are measuring sentiment differently to Schmeling (2007) who used an index of consumer 
confidence, if order-flow metrics reflect sentiment they too are likely to be non-stationary. Moreover, Ülkü 
and Weber (2013) undertake Dickey-Fuller non stationarity tests on aggregate order flow of different types of 
institutional investors and find that the level of each series is non-stationary but changes are stationary. Since 
our order flow imbalance measures are constructed from order flow information we would expect them to be 
non-stationary also.  
 
Prior to estimating the smooth transition model we apply Ng-Perron non-stationarity tests on the OFIL and  
D-OFIL series of each of the stocks and for the portfolios we described in Section 4.3. As shown in Table 3 
Panel C we find that for the sample stocks  only 3.4% of total-OFIL measures appear to be stationary but 
100% of total D-OFIL measures are stationary. Across the portfolios, 5.08% of the total-OFIL series are 
stationary and 100% of the total D-OFIL series are stationary
20
. A similar pattern is evident for the retail, 
stealth and large-OFIL and D-OFIL series.  
 
In this section, through a variety of tests we have shown that both retail and institutional sentiment can 
influence co-movement. The tests we have used however can be considered flawed as none of the tests we 
have examined tests directly whether order flow changes or shocks directly influence co-movement. Instead 
they indirectly suggest that changes in order flow imbalance and therefore sentiment are connected to co-
movement and that changes in  order flow imbalance lead to a reduction in co-movement. The analysis of 
this section motivates us to examine in the next section the STCC GARCH model which allows a direct 
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 In addition to the Ng-Perron tests we also undertake stationarity tests using Augmented Dickey Fuller, Phillips-Perron and 




relationship between order flow changes and return co-movement to be identified if it exists. Moreover, we 
have shown that when examining the issue of how sentiment influences stock returns shocks to sentiment 
should be examined rather than levels as levels will tend to be non-stationary. This suggests that the analysis 
of Kumar and Lee (2006) can not only be extended to institutional investors but can be improved upon in a 
number of ways.  
 
5. Smooth Transition Analysis  
Motivated by the desire to provide direct evidence that shocks to sentiment influence co-movement we now 
introduce the STCC GARCH model we estimate which is the primary focus of our analysis
21
. A specific 
advantage of the smooth transition model is that it only identifies a change in order flow imbalance as a 
shock if the change in the order flow imbalance reaches an endogenously determined threshold. An 
advantage of measuring shocks in this way is that minor variations in order flow imbalance will be ignored 
making shocks less noisy.  
 
The bi-variate STCC GARCH model proposed by Berben and Jansen (2005) and Silvennoinen and Teräsvirta 
(2005), enables us to capture the intertemporal time-varying behavior of stock return correlations
22
. In the 










. Where ypt is the excess return of 
portfolio p on day t, (Rpt-Rft) and ymt is the excess return of the market on day t, (Rmt-Rft). We utilize portfolio 
returns rather than stock returns to ensure that we eliminate the effects of firm specific news. We eliminate 
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 We utilise order flow shocks rather than return shocks for a variety of reasons. First, Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) in empirical 
work and the theoretical models we discussed in Section 2 show that causality runs from trading activity to prices. Second, returns 
contain frictions such as the bid-ask spread and errors in the analysis and interpretation of information, see for example Black 
(1986) so do not fully reflect order-flow or fundamentals. Moreover, the use of returns would not allow us to isolate the impact of 
sentiment which is our central focus. We recognise as shown by Ülkü and Weber (2013) recently that there may also be some bi-
directional causality since for example high buying pressure will raise returns which will encourage more trading activity. We 
attempt to mitigate these effects by eliminating serial correlation in both the return series and the order flow series but cannot 
guarantee these effects are eliminated completely.  
22
 Similar models (that capture possible regime switches) have been used in the context of stock market integration (Kearney and 
Poti, 2006; Silvennoinen and Teräsvirta, 2009; Savva, 2011), business cycles synchronization (Savva et al, 2010) and various 




any additional effects of market-wide information by including in the specification the market-wide risk 
factors HML, SMB and UMD
23
 and a vector of N macroeconomic innovations (MACRONt). These include 
the innovations associated with unexpected inflation, the monthly growth in industrial production, changes in 
the term structure, change in the difference between the yields of Moody’s BAA rated and AAA rated 
corporate bonds, changes in the monthly unemployment rate, and innovations in the average hourly earnings. 
The n λ coefficients capture the effects of changes in these macroeconomic variables on portfolio returns. 
 
We also control for the effects of macroeconomic news in the market return series ymt. To control for 
potential autocorrelation, lagged values of the portfolio/market returns are also included.
24
 The bi-variate 













mkmmt MACROyy     1,1  (2b) 
 
In equation (2a) and (2b) excess returns are conditional on all the information available up to time t-1 i.e. 
(Yt=E[Yt|Ψt−1]). In order to capture any temporal effects in the error volatilities and correlations, the error 










. These errors are 
assumed to have a zero mean and time varying structure as shown below.  
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 Recall we already extract (Rmt-Rft) 
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In this model the conditional variances of returns for both portfolio p (hpt) and the market return (hmt) are 
assumed to follow a GARCH(1,1) specification described by equation (5) and (6) respectively. The use of 
this specification is motivated by the empirical literature that has shown it adequately captures persistence of 




The contemporaneous conditional covariance between portfolio p and the market portfolio m  and therefore 
the conditional correlation measure we use in our analysis is described below  
. 




ρpm,t  = ρpm,0(1−Gt(st;g,c)) + ρpm,1Gt(st;g,c) (8) 
 
The smooth transition model allows the conditional correlations to change smoothly between two constant 
states as a function of the transition variable st as shown in (8) where the conditional correlation in the pre-
shock period is (ρpm,0) and the post shock correlation is (ρpm,1). Gt is the transition function whose values are 
bounded by 0 and 1. To capture temporal changes in ρpm,t we follow Berben and Jansen (2005) and 
Silvennoinen and Teräsvirta (2005) by letting  the logistic function 
 ),;( cgsG t  ,))((1
1 csge t             g>1 (9) 
where st is the order flow imbalance transition variable which we will call OFILst to distinguish it from OFIL. 
The OFILst are the residuals from a regression in which the percentage change in OFIL between day t and 




. To remove any serial 
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 The sizes of α and β, determine the short and long run dynamics of the resulting volatility series, respectively. Large β 
coefficients indicate that shocks to conditional variance take a long time to die out, implying persistent volatility. Large α 
parameters indicate that volatility reacts quite intensively to new information. Consequently, if α is large (and significant) and β is 
small, this means the volatility process is characterized by spikes. 
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dependence we also include the lagged values of OFILst
26
. The residuals from this regression will contain the 
effects of sentiment on order flow imbalance but will not contain the effects of firm specific, market-wide 
news (contained in Rm-Rf and already extracted as OFIL is used in the regression to obtain OFILst) or any 




Parameters g and c determine the smoothness and location, respectively, of the transition between the two 
correlation regimes. The starting values of g and c are determined by a grid search and are estimated in one 
step by maximizing the likelihood function. The likelihood function we estimate is shown below.  
  ( )   
 
 




   
                                                (10) 
where θ is the vector of all the parameters to be estimated.  





l                                                                    (11) 
To allow for potential non-normality of   |    , robust “sandwich” standard errors (Bollerslev and 
Wooldridge, 1992) are used for the estimated coefficients. 
 
The resulting Smooth Transition Conditional Correlation (STCC) GARCH model is able to capture a wide 
variety of patterns of change  where  ρpm,0 and ρpm,1 represent the pre and post shock conditional correlations. 
Differing ρpm,0 and ρpm,1  imply that the conditional correlations increase (ρpm,0 < ρpm,1) or decrease 
(ρpm,0 > ρp,m,1) in the post shock period, with the pace of change determined by the slope parameter g. This 
change is abrupt for large g, and becomes a step function as g → ∞, with a more gradual change represented 
by smaller values of this parameter.  
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 Again appropriate lag order is determined by SIC. 
27
 We include the Fama-French market-wide factors so the effect of macroeconomic news should be captured by the market return. 
However, since the effect of different macroeconomic factors may have a diverse impact we also include the macroeconomic 
factors which will allow us to capture the impact of macroeconomic news even when the responses between factors vary.   
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The parameter c defines the location of the transition and represents the order flow threshold used in this 
study to identify shocks. For each portfolio, when the percentage change in daily portfolio order flow is less 
(greater) than the corresponding threshold (parameter c), the conditional correlation between the return of 
portfolio p and the market return is closer to the state defined by ρpm,0 (ρpm,1) on that day. Once a shock  is 
detected the conditional correlation in the pre-shock and post-shock regime is calculated. We estimate the 
model (equations 2 -11) for all portfolios in bivariate combinations with the market. In subsequent tables we 
report the averages of the estimated parameters ρpm,0  and ρpm,1 for the portfolio samples that are described. 
We use four different measures of OFILst in our estimation. We use shocks to total-OFILst, shocks to retail 
OFILst and shocks to stealth and institutional OFILst to examine whether shocks to the sentiment of different 
investors directly influences co-movement.  
Prior to estimating the smooth transition model we apply the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test to each bi-variate 
equation to test the time varying model specified against a constant conditional correlation model as 
suggested by Berben and Jansen  (2005) and Silvennoinen and Teräsvirta (2005) and find that the null 
hypothesis is almost always rejected which suggests that a time varying model is appropriate
28
 . 
6. Smooth Transition Results  
6.1 All Firms 
In Table 4 Panel A we present the average of the pre and post shock conditional correlations obtained from 
the smooth transition model prior and subsequent to a shock to OFILst. These are the averages of the 
conditional correlations tpm,  calculated for the pre (ρpm,0) and post shock period (ρpm,1). In addition to these 
conditional correlations we also report the average change in conditional correlation after a shock to OFILst 
(average difference between ρpm,0 and ρpm,1 across all portfolios) along with a t-test which examines whether 
this average change is significant. We also conduct a further t-test which examines whether the post shock 
change in correlation is different for positive and negative shocks to OFILst (the + in Table 4). We also report 
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the percentage change in conditional correlation, each average change represents, to gauge the potential 
economic significance of the conditional correlation changes we have identified.  
 
For example, prior to a positive shock to total-OFILst the average conditional correlation between portfolio p 
and the market portfolio is 0.1860 and after a positive shock to total-OFILst average conditional correlations 
fall to 0.1693. Prior to a negative shock to total-OFILst pre shock conditional correlations are 0.2094 and post 
shock conditional correlations are 0.1782. This represents an average change of -0.0167(-8.98%) in 
conditional correlation after  positive shocks to total-OFILst and an average  change in conditional correlation 
of -0.0312(-14.90%) after negative shocks to total-OFILst. The + in Table 4 indicates that the change in 
correlation associated with positive and negative shocks to total-OFILst is statistically significant from each 
other using a t-test at a 5% level of significance.  Moreover, 63.2% of firms experience a fall in conditional 
correlation after a positive shock to total OFILst and 64% following a negative shock to total OFILst.  
 
The effect of total-OFILst shocks reveal an asymmetry in the size of the average conditional correlation 
changes associated with positive and negative shocks because negative shocks lead to larger changes in 
average conditional correlation than positive shocks. The usual explanation for such an asymmetry is that 
there has been a rise in conditional volatility of the negative shock sample relative to the positive shock 
sample. There are two possible competing explanations for this. The leverage explanation for the asymmetry 
suggested by  Black (1976) or Christie (1982) suggests that a fall in the value of the portfolio increases 
financial leverage, which makes the portfolio riskier raising its volatility. An alternative view for such an 
asymmetry suggested by Campbell and Hentschel (1992) is that the asymmetry is due to time variation in 
expected returns associated with the pricing of volatility. The causality of these two theories is therefore 
different. The leverage hypothesis suggests that return shocks lead to changes in conditional volatility, 
whereas the time-varying risk premium argument suggests that return shocks are caused by changes in 
conditional volatility.  An analysis of the average pre and post shock volatilities suggest that average post 
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shock volatility after a negative shock to total OFILst  rises by 15%, about 8% for retail and stealth OFILst 
and by about 4% after negative shocks to large OFILst. In contrast volatility changes after positive shocks are 
almost neutral and never more than +4% or -4% for  trader group.  
 
Conditional correlation reductions following a shock to retail-OFILst as well as stealth-OFILst and large-
OFILst are also evident. The largest average change in conditional correlation follows a shock to retail-OFILst 
as positive shocks on average lead to a 10.09% reduction in conditional correlation while a negative shock on 
average leads to a 14.74% fall in conditional correlation. Positive (negative) shocks to stealth-OFILst on 
average lead to a 8.07% (9.64%) decline in conditional correlations. This indicates that post-shock average 
correlation changes are smaller than for retail investors but also that the asymmetry of positive and negative 
shocks on average conditional correlation is also smaller following stealth-OFILst shocks than following 
retail OFILst shocks. Shocks to large-OFILst lead to the smallest post shock falls in average conditional 
correlation which are 7.01% following a positive shock to large-OFILst and 5.87% following a negative 
shock to large-OFILst. Moreover, in contrast to what we found for retail and stealth traders positive shocks to 
large-OFILst lead to slightly larger average changes in conditional correlation than do negative shocks to 
large-OFILst which causes the asymmetry to be reversed. A possible explanation for why shocks to large 
OFILst have a smaller impact on changes to conditional correlations than shocks to retail OFILst may stem 
from large institutional traders having very positive sentiment on average which might dilute the effects of a 
sentiment change.  
   
There is already a large literature that examines the impact of return shocks on correlation, see for example, 
Forbes and Rigbon (2002), Ang and Chen (2002),  Hong, Tu and Zhou (2007). The results from these studies 
show that positive shocks to return lead to a rise in co-movement and negative shocks to return lead to even 
larger increases in co-movement. Our results are not comparable to these studies for a number of reasons. We 
do not examine the effect of return shocks on correlation but examine the effects of order flow imbalance, 
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our measure of sentiment. Moreover, we extract from order flow imbalance the effects of the market return, 
and factors reflecting size, book-to market and momentum as well as macroeconomic information. This 
provides us with a measure of order flow imbalance that is free of the effects of information originating from 
market-wide factors other than sentiment. In contrast, in these previous studies the effect of information 
shocks, in particular market shocks,  is allowed to influence returns in the pre and post shock period. It is 
therefore the response of investors to information shocks that alter returns leading to an increase in 
correlation.  
 
To examine the role of market wide information further we estimate the smooth transition model using a 
measure of market sentiment without the market adjustments. This allows us to capture the effects of 
information trading on the order-flow imbalance. We calculate market sentiment as the average of the D-
OFIL values across all stocks. We do not extract any market factors from this series. When we estimate the 
smooth transition model we find that the pre shock correlation is 0.2067 rising to 0.5100 following a shock. 
This suggests that it is the arrival of new market information that leads to a rise in post-shock correlations 
that is noted in previous studies that examine how return shocks influence correlation.  
 
6.2 Influence of Existing Sentiment 
Panel B of Table 4 shows that the magnitude of the post shock change in conditional correlation and the 
direction of the asymmetry is sensitive to whether the pre shock OFILst value is >1 or <1.  Partitioning the 
firms in this way suggests that the pre-shock level of sentiment, influences the size of changes to conditional 
correlation in the post shock period. When the pre-shock OFILst ratio is >1 and sentiment is optimistic 
positive shocks to OFILst generally lead to larger changes in conditional correlation than negative shocks but 
when the pre-shock OFILst ratio is <1 and sentiment is pessimistic negative shocks lead to larger changes in 
conditional correlation than positive shocks to OFILst. This suggests that shocks that re-enforce existing 




When the pre shock total-OFILst ratio is >1 positive shocks to total-OFILst lead to a 14.94% fall in average 
conditional correlation but average conditional correlation decreases by only 9.79% after a negative shock to 
retail-OFILst.  When the pre-shock total-OFILst is <1 positive shocks to total-OFILst lead to a 9.82% fall in 
average  conditional correlation but following negative shocks to total-OFILst there is a 23.34% reduction in 
conditional correlation. This shows that when sentiment is optimistic positive shocks to total-OFILst have a 
larger impact on average conditional correlation reduction than negative shocks to total-OFILst but when 
sentiment is  pessimistic negative shocks to total-OFILst lead to larger reductions  in average conditional 
correlation than positive shocks to total-OFILst.  
 
We also find that the pre-shock level of sentiment also influences the direction of the asymmetry for the 
different investor groups. When the pre-shock retail-OFILst is >1 positive shocks to retail-OFILst lead to a 
26.57% reduction in conditional correlation but when shocks are negative there is a 15.36% reduction in 
conditional correlation. When sentiment is pessimistic and the pre-shock retail-OFILst  is <1  positive shocks 
to retail-OFILst lead to a 25.94% reduction in conditional correlation but a 28.85% reduction following a 
negative shock to retail OFILst.  
 
When the pre-shock stealth-OFILst ratio is >1 the average changes in conditional correlation following a 
shock to stealth-OFILst shows a large asymmetry in which positive shocks to stealth-OFILst lead to a 13.26% 
reduction in correlation  but negative shocks to stealth-OFILst only lead to a 3.89% reduction in average 
conditional correlation.  However, when stealth-OFILst is <1 the asymmetry is reversed as positive shocks 
lead to a 13.41% reduction in average conditional correlation but negative shocks to stealth OFILst lead to a 
19.15% reduction in average conditional correlation. When large-OFILst is >1 positive shocks to large-OFILst 
lead to slightly larger changes in conditional correlation than negative shocks. However, when large-OFILst is 
<1 the asymmetry is not reversed as positive shocks to large-OFILst lead to a 7.40% fall in conditional 
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correlation and negative shocks to large-OFILst lead to a 3.16% fall in conditional correlation. This suggests 
that only for retail and stealth investors are shocks to sentiment always re-enforcing.  
 
6.3 S&P500 Index Constituents 
Table 5 provides the conditional correlation results from the smooth transition model separately for portfolios 
which are constructed from S&P500 index constituents and non S&P500 index  constituents respectively. We 
make this segregation because the S&P500  index is an important habitat for some institutional investors and 
membership has been shown to be associated with elevated levels of sentiment, see for example Barberis et al 
(2008). Moreover, preliminary results presented in Table 1 and 2  suggested that there was more positive 
sentiment and greater co-ordination of trading activity for S&P500 index constituents than for non S&P500 
index constituents. Panel A provides the smooth transition conditional correlation results associated with 
shocks to total-OFILst while Panel B provides the results for shocks to retail, stealth and large institutional 
OFILst.  
 
The conditional correlations prior to a shock to total-OFILst indicate that portfolios drawn from S&P500 
index constituents have higher conditional correlations than portfolios drawn from non S&P500 index 
constituents. This suggests that S&P500 index constituents have higher levels of co-movement than non 
S&P500 index constituents in general and is consistent with the findings of Harford and Kaul (2005) who 
compare return unconditional correlations of S&P500 index constituents and non S&P500 index 
constituents
29
. Higher levels of co-movement for portfolios drawn from S&P500 index constituents is also 
evident for the models estimated using  retail, stealth and large institutional OFILst.  
 
Positive shocks to total-OFILst, for portfolios drawn from S&P500 index constituents, leads to a 20.07% fall 
in average conditional correlation while negative shocks lead to a 24.07% fall in conditional correlation. In 
                                                 
29
 The frequency used by Harford and Kaul ( 2005) is 15minute returns which show that the average pairwise unconditional 
correlation between securities within the S&P500 index during 1996 is 0.117 but 0.017 for non S&P500 constituents.   
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contrast, positive shocks to total OFILst for portfolios drawn from non-S&P500 index constituents lead to a 
19.37% fall in  conditional correlation on average but a 30.30% average fall in conditional correlation if the 
shock to total-OFILst is a negative one. This shows that positive shocks to total-OFILst have a similar impact 
on S&P500 and non S&P500 portfolios but negative shocks to total -OFILst have a larger impact on 
portfolios comprising of non S&P500 index constituents. Moreover, we also find that the asymmetry in 
which positive shocks to total-OFILst lead to a smaller change in correlation than negative shocks is apparent 
for portfolios comprising of  S&P500 index constituents and for portfolios comprising of non S&P500 index 
constituents.  
 
In panel B of Table 5 we present the conditional pre and post shock correlations associated with portfolios 
drawn from S&P500 and non S&P500 index constituents for retail, stealth and large institutional traders. We 
find that shocks to retail-OFILst lead to larger falls in average conditional correlation when portfolios 
comprise of S&P500 index constituents than when portfolios consist only of non S&P500 index constituents. 
The fall in average conditional correlation for portfolios comprising of S&P500 index constituents following 
a positive shock to retail-OFILst is 22.47%  but a fall of 24.68% arises following negative shocks to retail-
OFILst. Changes in conditional correlation following shocks to retail-OFILst when portfolios comprise of non 
S&P500 index constituents are smaller. Following positive shocks to retail-OFILst there is actually a small  
rise rather than a fall in average conditional correlation. For portfolios drawn from both S&P500 and non 
S&P500 index constituents we find that shocks to retail-OFILst lead to larger reductions in conditional 
correlation if the shock is negative confirming the asymmetry we identified earlier.   
 
For portfolios comprising of S&P500 index constituents positive and negative shocks to stealth OFILst lead 
to approximately a 10% and a 8% fall in post shock conditional correlations respectively. While shocks to 
stealth-OFILst for non S&P500 constituents lead to a fall in conditional correlation of approximately 10% 
following positive or negative shocks to stealth-OFILst. These changes are therefore of a similar magnitude 
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for S&P500 and for non S&P500 constituents. Positive shocks to large-OFILst lead to a fall of 8.90% in 
conditional correlation if portfolios comprise of S&P500 index constituents and a 15.03% fall in conditional 
correlation if the shock to large-OFILst is negative. Shocks to non S&P500 constituents have a smaller impact 
as positive shocks to large-OFIL lead to a 3.65% fall in average conditional correlation while negative shocks 
to large-OFILst have no impact on average conditional correlation. This shows that changes to conditional 




6.4 Overall Analysis of Smooth Transition Results.  
 
This section has shown that positive and negative shocks to order flow imbalance which capture shocks to 
sentiment lead to economically large reductions in the conditional correlation between portfolio returns and 
the market return in the post shock period. This indicates that sentiment changes that increase sentiment and 
shocks that reduce sentiment both lead to reductions in co-movement. In general we find that negative shocks 
lead to larger reductions in co-movement than positive shocks.  
 
Another key discovery of the  STCC GARCH model is that shocks to the sentiment of retail investors leads 
to larger reductions in co-movement than do shocks to the sentiment of institutional stealth investors or large 
institutional traders. This is consistent with our findings in Table 3 and those of Kumar and Lee (2006) that 
showed that changes to retail sentiment were negatively correlated with the market return. With the use of the 
shocks obtained from the STCC GARCH model we have shown that shocks to the sentiment of stealth and 
large institutional traders also lead to reduced co-movement. This  was not apparent when we calculated the 
average pairwise correlations between the portfolio D-OFIL of  traders and the market return. This difference 
probably stems from the advantage of the STCC GARCH model which only uses shocks that are above the 




Having shown that changes in sentiment lead to a reduction in co-movement we next examine the firm 
characteristics that are associated with sentiment shocks. We undertake this analysis because we have also 
shown that the level of sentiment is related to firm characteristics. Moreover, being able to identify the 
characteristics of firms that are associated with sentiment changes will allow investors to build portfolios that 
will be most able to take advantage of the conditional correlation reductions we have identified.   
 
7. Firm Characteristics and Sentiment Changes 
In this section we explore the influence that firm characteristics play in influencing the change in sentiment.  
We do this because different firms are likely to be influenced to differing degrees by sentiment because of the 
difficulties and costs associated with arbitrage, prevalence of investor habitats and diverse investors being 
influenced by sentiment differently and in a non-synchronous way.   
 
Because we wish to identify firm level characteristics we return to firm level analysis of OFIL. We estimate a 
panel regression with fixed-effects in which the firm level D-OFIL is regressed against the firm 
characteristics we have examined. D-OFIL is the change in order flow imbalance and is used here as a proxy 
for order flow shocks. Our aim with this analysis is to gauge whether firm characteristics are likely to 
influence changes in the level of investor sentiment for a firm
30
. We estimate the regression separately for 
total D-OFIL, retail D-OFIL, stealth D-OFIL and large D-OFIL to establish how the characteristics of 
individual firms influences changes to the sentiment of specific investor groups. Since we have shown that 
positive and negative shocks  influence conditional correlation differently we estimate the model separately 
for positive and negative changes to D-OFIL
31
. The model we estimate is described by equation (12).    
D-OFILitm=β1 +β2SMBt + β3HMLt + β4UMDt + β5SIZEit+ β6ILLIQit+ β7PRICEit + β8B/Mit + β9EPSit + β10EGit+ 
β11AGEit + β13CMit + β14OWNit + β15INTit + β16SPit +  εit      (12) 
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 We are unable to undertake this analysis on the portfolio level D-OFIL as at a portfolio level firm characteristics diversify away. 
31
 We partition firms according to whether the change in the order flow imbalance is positive or negative. We then estimate the 
regression separately for positive and negative samples.  
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where D-OFILitm  is the change in the order flow imbalance  of investor group m (total, retail, stealth or 
institutional) in month t for firm i. β1 is a constant. SMB, HML and UMD are Fama-French risk factors, since 
OFIL has already extracted the influence of (Rmt-Rft) we do not include this again. We include the Fama-French 
factors as additional controls for market wide information as they are important determinants of expected 
returns and may capture some changes to order flow imbalance that are associated with market-wide 
information that we have not already captured. They therefore control for changes in order flow that are 
unrelated to sentiment. Size, ILLIQ, PRICE, B/M, EPS, EG, AGE, CM, OWN, INT are all characteristics 
which we have shown previously may influence the sentiment of investors. Size and  ILLIQ are features that 
make some stocks more difficult to arbitrage. The low price of some stocks, EPS, earnings growth, age, level 
of intangibles are all characteristics that can make some stocks more difficult to value. Size, book-to-market, 
investor ownership, and correlation with the market are all characteristics that may be associated with the 
habitat of specific investors. We also include a dummy variable which has a value of unity if a firm is a 
member of the S&P500 index but has a value of zero otherwise(SP). We include this variable to determine 
whether membership of the S&P500 index influences sentiment after we have incorporated and therefore 
controlled for firm characteristics.      
 
Results are contained in Table 6. These show that for each investor group positive and negative shocks are 
always influenced by the age of the firm in terms of its exchange listing and the EPS of the firm. These 
appear to be the only characteristics that exert an independent effect on sentiment changes across each 
investor group. However, we also find that specific characteristics are associated with specific investor 
groups. This diversity may reflect differences in the habitats of the different investors and the relative 
importance of different firm characteristics for the determination of sentiment and co-movement.  
 
In addition to AGE and EPS positive and negative changes to total D-OFIL are influenced by INT, OWN, 
and price. While positive shocks only are influenced by earnings growth and  B/M while  negative changes 
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are influenced by illiquidity. For retail investors there are greater differences between which firm 
characteristics influence positive and negative shocks. No additional characteristics to age and EPS 
influences both positive and negative shocks. OWN, EG and PRICE influence positive changes to D-OFIL 
only and Illiquidity influences negative shocks only. For stealth investors no other firm characteristics 
influence changes in D-OFIL other than AGE and EPS. In the case of large D-OFIL as well as the influence 
of AGE and EPS illiquidity influences positive and negative changes in D-OFIL while earnings growth and 
intangibles influence positive D-OFIL changes only.    
 
8. Robustness Tests  
8.1 Sub-Period Analysis  
We next estimate the smooth transition model over different sub-periods. The first covers the period 1993-
2000 and the second 2001-2011. These have been selected to cover the period prior to decimalization and 
subsequent to decimalization. Separating these two periods is  important as the post decimalization period is 
associated with a reduction in trading costs and raised trading activity, see for example Bessembinder (2003) 
and also coincides with a rise in trading activity from high frequency traders.  
 
The results from the estimation of the smooth transition model over these two periods is contained in Table 7 
and show that our key finding that sentiment shocks   (shocks to OFILst) lead to reduced co-movement is 
maintained across both sub-periods. However, it is also obvious that shocks to sentiment have slightly larger 
effects on co-movement in the period 1993-2000. During the period prior to substantial high frequency 
trading positive shocks to total-OFILst lead to nearly a 15% fall in average conditional correlation while 
negative shocks lead to just over a 16% fall in average conditional correlation. In the period of high 
frequency trading positive shocks to total-OFILst lead to a 6% fall in average conditional correlation while 
negative shocks to total-OFILst lead to approximately a 12% fall in average conditional correlation. However, 
in both periods shocks to total-OFILst lead to lower average conditional correlations in the post shock period 
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and the discovery that positive shocks leads to smaller changes in average conditional correlations than 
negative shocks is robust across the two periods.  
 
 The slightly reduced effect of order flow imbalance shocks on co-movement is also evident in the results for 
retail, stealth and institutional traders. Retail investors exhibit the greatest changes to co-movement in 
response to their OFILst shocks but in the period of high frequency trading the changes in co-movement are 
smaller. Even though the change in co-movement is smaller for retail investors  in the later period on average 
positive and negative shocks to retail-OFILst still lead to changes in co-movement of nearly 10% in response 
to positive retail-OFILst shocks and over 11% in response to negative OFILst shocks. Stealth investors 
experience the greatest differences across the two periods as the effect of positive shocks to stealth OFILst 
leads to an average reduction in conditional correlation of -11.44% in the first period but a -5.57% fall in the 
second. While negative shocks to stealth-OFILst lead to an average fall in conditional correlation of 14.81% 
in the first period and a fall of 5.96% in the second period. The effect of positive shocks to large-OFILst in 
the earlier period is about -7% and this is almost unchanged in the later period. In the earlier period negative 
shocks to large-OFILst lead to a 12% reduction in co-movement while in the later period negative shocks to 
large OFILst have no statistical effect on co-movement.  
 
8.2. Different Return Horizons 
We next estimate the smooth transition model using different return intervals to establish the robustness of 
our results using shocks to order flow captured over one day. We do this by estimating the smooth transition 
model using two-day and  five-day returns and measuring the shock using the D-OFIL value over two and 
five days respectively. As before the smooth transition model analyses positive and negative shocks to order 
flow sentiment separately. We report the results using Total D-OFIL, Retail D-OFIL, Stealth D-OFIL and 
Large D-OFIL in Table 8. A finding that the reductions in co-movement weaken using longer return intervals 
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would suggest that the effects of shocks to sentiment contain a transitory component while larger declines in 
co-movement following shocks would suggest the effect of the shock is amplified over longer horizons. 
 
The results associated with shocks to Total-D-OFIL suggest that at a two day return horizon   the magnitude 
of the fall in correlation following a shock to order flow sentiment is substantial and comparable to that of 
one day returns. Positive shocks at a five day interval lead to a slight rise in correlation. However, negative 
shocks lead to a larger fall in correlation at a five day horizon. For retail sentiment we find broadly similar 
results at two and five day intervals (positive shocks lead to slightly larger correlation reductions). For stealth 
investors the effect of shocks to their sentiment tend to diminish slightly as return horizons increase. For 
shocks to large trader sentiment positive and negative shocks lead to slightly larger decreases in correlation at 
a two-day and five-day return interval. This shows that except for five day positive shocks to Total sentiment 
and negative shocks to Stealth sentiment the results at different intervals are broadly similar. This suggests 
that negative shocks to sentiment across all investors tends to be longer lasting.  
 
9. Conclusion 
In this paper we studied the impact that shocks to sentiment, measured through shocks to order flow 
imbalance, have on co-movement. We are motivated to undertake the analysis because the paper by Kumar 
and Lee (2006) which documents a link between the order flow levels of retail investors and the portfolio 
returns of small  investors raised a number of unanswered questions.  
 
The replication of some of the Kumar and Lee analysis shows that the sentiment of institutional investors as 
well as the sentiment of retail investors, is an important determinant of stock returns. This suggests that both 
retail and institutional investors display sentiment that may influence co-movement. A problem with the 
analysis of Kumar and Lee (2006) is that they do not directly model the effect of sentiment or sentiment 
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changes on co-movement. This motivates us to estimate the STCC GARCH model which provides direct 
measures of how correlations between a portfolio and the market change in response to an order flow shock.  
 
Our results show that positive and negative shocks to total order flow reduce co-movement. Positive shocks 
to the order flow imbalance levels of retail traders has a larger impact on co-movement changes than is the 
case for shocks to the order flow imbalance of stealth and large traders. We discover an asymmetry in how 
positive and negative shocks to sentiment influence co-movement. Positive shocks have a smaller influence 
on co-movement than negative shocks, an asymmetry that is evident for total shocks, retail shocks and stealth 
shocks but is reversed for shocks associated with large institutional traders.  
 
We examine the firm characteristics which have been associated with sentiment and find that a range of these 
are correlated with shocks to order flow imbalance. This suggests that order flow shocks are linked to firm 
characteristics which suggests that sentiment changes and their relationship to co-movement changes is 
influenced by firm level features.  
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Panel A and B of this table presents the average daily order flow imbalance level (OFIL) associated with sample stocks. OFIL for 
security i on day t is calculated as the ratio of the aggregate dollar value of  buyer initiated trades to the aggregate dollar value of 
seller initiated trades less the market return. The values reported in each table are averaged across days and securities. Total refers 
to the total-OFIL which is calculated using all trades, Retail refers to retail-OFIL and is calculated using only buyer and seller 
initiated trades classified as small, stealth captures stealth-OFIL and is calculated from medium sized trades, Large refers to the 
large-OFIL calculated from only the largest trades. All firms provides averages across all firms, S&P500 and non S&P500 
partitions firms according to whether or not firms are S&P500 index constituents. Order imbalance  >1 and <1 are samples which 
are segregated according to whether the order imbalance  ratio on day t is <1 or >1. In Panel B  firms are sorted into one of five 
groups based on the magnitude of firm characteristics. Group 1 contains firms with the smallest characteristic value and group 5 
contains firms with the largest characteristic value. The firm characteristics we use are SIZE(market value), ILLIQ (the Amihud 
illiquidity ratio), B/M(book-to-market ratio), PRICE(closing price), AGE(years listed on the exchange), CM(correlation between 
the daily return of stock i and the market), OWN(proportion of institutional  investor ownership), INT(proportion of intangible 
asset values to total asset value), EPS (earnings per share) and EG(earnings growth).   
 
Panel A:Average Order Flow Imbalance Levels(OFIL). 
 




imbalance  <1  
Total 1.053 1.158 1.045 1.585 0.636 
Retail 1.039 1.028 1.040 1.509 0.665 
Stealth 1.047 1.077 1.046 1.427 0.702 
Large 1.133 1.204 1.128 1.815 0.588 
 
Panel B:Average Order Flow Imbalance Level(OFIL) by Firm Characteristic. 
 
Total SIZE  ILLIQ B/M PRICE AGE CM OWN INT EPS EG 
1 Low 0.9038 1.114 1.0622 0.8905 0.9511 1.0088 0.9794 1.0353 1.0961 1.0558 
2 0.9356 1.089 1.0791 0.987 4 0.9760 1.0578 0.9824 1.0490 1.0933 1.0589 
3 1.0203 1.0476 1.0648 1.0491 0.9984 1.0657 1.0403 1.0659 1.0762 1.0678 
4 1.0872 0.9863 1.0426 1.0825 1.0305 1.0561 1.0804 1.0608 1.0461 1.0858 
5 High 1.1224 0.9544 0.9936 1.1186 1.0480 1.0215 1.1091 1.0605 0.9925 1.0955 
           
           Retail SIZE  ILLIQ B/M PRICE AGE CM OWN INT EPS EG 
1 Low 0.9524 1.0156 1.0492 0.9368 0.9520 1.0250 1.0107 1.0480 1.0723 1.0297 
2 0.9966 1.051 1.0586 1.0134 0.9750 1.0552 1.0094 1.0354 1.0621 1.0379 
3 1.0554 1.0569 1.0479 1.0511 0.9952 1.0458 1.0214 1.0444 1.0470 1.0546 
4 1.0646 1.0331 1.032 1.0626 1.0264 1.0252 1.0460 1.0406 1.0367 1.0686 
5 High 1.0454 1.015 1.0022 1.0722 1.0412 1.0065 1.0664 1.0415 1.0357 1.0794 
           
           Stealth SIZE  ILLIQ B/M PRICE AGE CM OWN INT EPS EG 
1 Low 0.9809 1.0558 1.0601 0.9427 0.9986 1.0259 1.0206 1.0439 1.0768 1.0331 
2 0.9639 1.0683 1.0628 1.0053 1.0110 1.0539 0.9964 1.0385 1.0703 1.0368 
3 1.0252 1.0536 1.0466 1.0369 1.0216 1.0471 1.0119 1.0512 1.0515 1.0536 
4 1.0658 1.0117 1.0304 1.0545 1.0397 1.0377 1.0518 1.0526 1.0234 1.0722 
5 High 1.0708 0.992 1.017 1.078 1.0464 1.0269 1.0872 1.0574 1.0037 1.0776 
Large SIZE  ILLIQ B/M PRICE AGE CM OWN INT EPS EG 
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1 Low 1.4909 1.171 1.1523 1.1248 1.0762 1.1248 1.1496 1.1285 1.1543 1.1416 
2 1.0241 1.1472 1.1417 1.0822 1.0900 1.1198 1.1054 1.1357 1.1502 1.1334 
3 1.051 1.1075 1.1326 1.1034 1.1024 1.1299 1.1176 1.1440 1.1307 1.1287 
4 1.1385 1.0531 1.1274 1.138 1.1204 1.1231 1.1260 1.1321 1.1115 1.1424 
5 High 1.1692 1.0494 1.1115 1.1634 1.1300 1.1156 1.1530 1.1363 1.0819 1.1604 














































This table presents the average pairwise unconditional correlation between the change in order-flow imbalance level (D-OFIL) of 
stock i and stock j. Total refers to the correlation between the D-OFIL of firm i and j when OFIL has been calculated using all 
trades. Retail presents average pairwise correlation results between the retail D-OFIL of stock i and j (small trade classification). 
Stealth reflects the average pairwise correlation in D-OFIL of stocks when OFIL is based on the medium size trade classification. 
Large refers to the correlations between the D-OFIL of firms when OFIL is calculated using only large trades. In Panel A All Firms 
refers to a sample in which stocks i and j are drawn from all firms available, S&P500 and non S&P500 samples partition S&P500 
index and non-index constituents. OFIL >1 and <1 are samples which are segregated according to whether trader OFIL on day t is 
> or <1. In Panel B  firms are sorted into one of five groups based on the magnitude of firm characteristics. These are SIZE(market 
value), ILLIQ (the Amihud illiquidity ratio), B/M(book-to-market ratio), PRICE (closing price), AGE (years listed on the 
exchange), CM(correlation between the daily return of stock i and the market), OWN(proportion of institutional  investor 
ownership), INT(proportion of intangible assets), EPS (earnings to price ratio) and EG(earnings growth). Panel C provides the 
results from regressing portfolio i’s correlation with the market against the average of the firm characteristics within a portfolio.  
 
Panel A:Average Pairwise Correlation Between D-OFIL of Firm i and j. 
 
 
All Firms S&P500 Non S&P500 OFIL  >1  OFIL <1  
Total 0.038 0.016 0.049 0.052 0.185 
Retail 0.095 0.234 0.087 0.102 0.178 
Stealth  0.056 0.033 0.071 0.052 0.161 
Large 0.053 0.136 0.049 0.056 0.100 
 
 
Panel B: Correlation Between D-OFIL of Firm i and j by Firm Characteristic. 
           Total  SIZE ILLIQ B/M PRICE AGE CM OWN INT EPS EG 
1 Low 0.0809 0.0597 0.0543 0.0547 0.1447 0.0371 0.0670 0.0521 0.0395 0.0557 
2 0.0591 0.0385 0.0376 0.0374 0.0616 0.0433 0.0661 0.0309 0.0446 0.0559 
3 0.0658 0.0506 0.0552 0.0559 0.0568 0.0552 0.0562 0.0478 0.0343 0.0355 
4 0.0690 0.0426 0.0599 0.0512 0.0400 0.0569 0.0516 0.0485 0.0627 0.0495 
5 High 0.0234 0.0703 0.0740 0.0763 0.0539 0.0486 0.0434 0.0487 0.0656 0.0419 
           Retail SIZE ILLIQ B/M PRICE AGE CM OWN INT EPS EG 
1 Low 0.0873 0.1259 0.1148 0.1143 0.1513 0.0849 0.0763 0.0840 0.1561 0.0972 
2 0.0795 0.1154 0.1074 0.1069 0.0885 0.1627 0.1053 0.0852 0.1477 0.0903 
3 0.1037 0.1189 0.1085 0.1106 0.0928 0.1503 0.1139 0.1099 0.1171 0.1249 
4 0.1626 0.0781 0.0735 0.0740 0.0905 0.1238 0.1285 0.1115 0.1019 0.1218 
5 High 0.2009 0.1000 0.1064 0.1089 0.1346 0.0778 0.1731 0.1144 0.0709 0.1078 
           Stealth SIZE ILLIQ B/M PRICE AGE CM OWN INT EPS EG 
1 Low 0.1539 0.0628 0.0538 0.0545 0.2015 0.0569 0.0693 0.0820 0.0527 0.0905 
2 0.0848 0.0535 0.0521 0.0521 0.1145 0.0741 0.0792 0.0459 0.0620 0.0954 
3 0.1060 0.0565 0.0682 0.0645 0.1102 0.0526 0.0864 0.0560 0.0546 0.0522 
4 0.1270 0.1159 0.0877 0.0888 0.0494 0.0831 0.0532 0.0521 0.0796 0.0493 
5 High 0.0408 0.1210 0.1296 0.1373 0.0446 0.0580 0.0551 0.0547 0.0958 0.0481 
           
           Large SIZE ILLIQ B/M PRICE AGE CM OWN INT EPS EG 
1 Low 0.4140 0.0665 0.0721 0.0704 0.2439 0.0869 0.0986 0.0717 0.0884 0.0856 
2 0.2346 0.0694 0.0535 0.0521 0.0951 0.0807 0.0852 0.0442 0.0915 0.0573 
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3 0.1089 0.0697 0.0767 0.0723 0.0809 0.0692 0.0706 0.0773 0.0752 0.0730 
4 0.0679 0.1027 0.0879 0.0874 0.0681 0.0907 0.0717 0.0792 0.0629 0.0870 
5 High 0.1006 0.1386 0.1374 0.1433 0.0898 0.1233 0.0918 0.0858 0.0823 0.0818 
            
Panel C: Multivariate Correlation Regressions  
 TOTAL  RETAIL  STEALTH  LARGE  
 Coef t-test Coef t-test Coef t-test Coef t-test 
Constant 0.0810 2.99 0.0464 0.67 0.2412 6.90 -0.2469 -2.18 
SIZE 0.0045 4.56 0.0012 0.46 -0.0004 -0.30 0.0144 2.56 
ILLIQ -0.0008 -2.88 -0.0038 -2.42 -0.0006 -0.45 0.0542 1.25 
PRICE 0.0019 0.89 0.0015 1.23 0.0740 0.53 0.0382 1.04 
B/M 0.0004 0.11 -0.0098 -1.20 -0.0041 -1.15 0.0082 0.51 
EPS 0.0009 0.63 -0.0001 -0.03 0.0008 0.41 0.0000 -1.81 
EG 0.0083 0.81 -0.0452 -1.39 -0.0249 -1.56 -0.0400 -0.74 
AGE -0.0252 -6.08 0.0406 3.85 -0.0415 -9.42 0.0127 0.77 
OFIL 0.0043 1.73 -0.0322 -1.68 -0.0439 -4.73 0.0606 2.02 
CM 0.0447 3.18 0.2926 7.56 0.1012 5.23 -0.3376 -3.31 
OWN -0.0065 -1.96 -0.0039 -0.46 -0.0089 -2.12 0.0174 1.43 
INT 0.0130 2.42 0.0145 1.03 0.0148 2.22 0.0171 0.81 


































Table 3: Order Flow Imbalance and Returns 
60 
 
In Panel A of this table we present the coefficients from the estimation of the following regression equation. In this model  Rpt are 
the returns to portfolio p in excess of the risk free rate (Rf), α and βn are coefficients.   
Rpt-Rft=α+ β1(Rmt-Rft)+β2SMBt+ β3HMLt +β4UMDt+ β5OFILpt +ξpt  
SMB is the return to the Fama-French small firm factor, HML is the return to the Fama-French book-to market factor and  UMD is 
the return to the momentum factor. OFILpt is the market return adjusted order flow imbalance level of portfolio p. The OFIL we use 
in the regressions are the Total, Retail, Stealth and Large OFIL values, we include each one in turn as well as estimating a version 
which includes retail, stealth and large OFIL. The p values are shown in parenthesis, *** indicates significance at a 1% level, ** at 
a 5% level and * at a 10% level. Panel B presents the average pairwise contemporaneous correlation coefficient between the 
change in order flow imbalance level (D-OFIL) on day t for firm i and the excess market return. In the column headed Total, 
Retail, Stealth and Large correlations are calculated from the D-OFIL of the different investor groups.  Panel C presents the 
proportion of Ng-Perron non-stationarity tests that indicate the series is stationary. All stocks refers to the proportion of test results 
found to be stationary when the test is applied to individual stock level OFIL values. All portfolios refers to the proportion of OFIL 
values found to be stationary when the series being tested are portfolio order flow imbalance levels. Total, Retail, Stealth and Large 




Panel A: Relationship between Portfolio Returns and Investor OFIL 
 
Total Retail Stealth Large Full 
Constant >0.000 >0.000 >0.000 >-0.000 >0.000 
 
(0.34) (-0.00)*** (0.58) (-0.00)***  (-0.00)***  
RMF 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.008 
 
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
SMB 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 






UMD -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
Total-OFIL 0.017 
    
 
( 0.00.)*** 



















   
0.091 0.070 
    
( 0.00)*** ( 0.00)*** 





Panel B: Average Pairwise Correlation between Investor D-OFIL and Market Excess Return 
 Total Retail Stealth Large 
Cor -0.030 -0.110 -0.073 0.058 




Panel C: Results of Stationarity Tests on  Stocks and Portfolios.  
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 All Stocks 
 
All Portfolios 
  OFIL D-OFIL  OFIL D-OFIL 
Total 3.40 100 5.08 100 
Retail 3.75 100 4.88 100 
Stealth 3.48 100 3.31 100 














































Table 4: Smooth Transition Conditional Correlation Results  
This table shows the average pairwise pre and post shock portfolio conditional correlation coefficient obtained from the STCC GARCH model. 
These are reported separately for positive shocks to OFILst  (+ shock) and negative shocks to OFILst(- shock). Total, Retail, Stealth and Large 
presents model results separately for shocks to total, retail, stealth and large OFILst. Pre shock cor is the average pairwise conditional correlation 
between portfolio p and the market prior to a shock to OFILst. Post shock cor is the average pairwise conditional correlation between portfolio p 
and the market portfolio after a shock to OFILst. Δ cor is the average change in the post shock conditional correlation between the post shock and 
pre shock period. A + indicates that the average difference between the average conditional correlation change following positive shocks to 
OFILst is statistically different to the average change in conditional correlation following negative shocks to OFILst  at a 5% level using a t-test. 
The t-test is a test of whether the change in conditional correlation following a shock to OFILst is significant at a 5% level. % Δ in cor is the 
percentage change in average conditional correlation that takes place after a shock to OFILst. The % Δ in cor<0 captures the proportion of 
negative changes in conditional correlation as a percentage of all changes following a shock. In Panel A all firms presents the results for the full 
sample of firms while Panel B partitions the sample according to whether the trader OFIL in the pre-shock period was >1 or <1. 
 
Panel  A. All Firms   






 + shock - shock +shock 
-shock +shock -shock +shock -shock 
Pre shock cor  0.1860 0.2094 0.3378 0.2843 0.3085 0.3040 0.3953 0.3358 
Post shock cor 0.1693 0.1782 0.3037 0.2424 0.2836 0.2747 0.3676 0.3161 
Δ cor  -0.0167 -0.0312+ -0.0341 -0.0419+ -0.0249 -0.0293+ -0.0277 -0.0197+ 
t-test -22.55 -26.50 -26.25 -33.72 -22.99 -28.87 -19.05 -6.96 
% Δ in cor -8.98% -14.90% -10.09% -14.74% -8.07% -9.64% -7.01% -5.87% 
% Δ Cor <0   63.2%  64.0% 62.5% 73.5% 51.07% 66.9% 62.3% 49.7% 
                                               
Panel B.  Firms with pre-shock OFILst > 1 








 + shock - shock 
+shock 
-shock 
+shock -shock +shock -shock 
Pre shock cor  0.328 0.337 0.286 0.280 0.279 0.334 0.343 0.389 
Post shock cor 0.279 0.304 0.210 0.237 0.242 0.321 0.316 0.366 
Δ cor  -0.049 -0.033+ -0.076 -0.043+ -0.037 -0.013+ -0.027 -0.023+ 
t-test -33.98 -17.61 -43.96 -24.23 -19.26 -13.39 -11.89 -12.73 
% Δ in cor -14.94% -9.79% -26.57% -15.36% -13.26% -3.89% -7.87% -5.91% 
% Δ in cor<0 54.7% 49.1% 69.8% 55.5% 70.6% 63.3% 45.6% 57.1% 
 
               Firms with pre-shock OFILst <1  

















Pre shock cor  0.275 0.287 0.293 0.312 0.261 0.235 0.392 0.412 
Post shock cor 0.248 0.220 0.217 0.222 0.226 0.190 0.363 0.399 
Δ cor  -0.027 -0.067+ -0.076 -0.090+ -0.035 -0.045+ -0.029 -0.013+ 
t-test -5.04 -13.13  -2.08 -45.17 -7.76 -13.30 -7.74 -2.80 
% Δ in cor -9.82% -23.34% -25.94% -28.85% -13.41% -19.15% -7.40% -3.16% 




Table 5: Smooth Transition Results S&P500 Partitions 
 
This table presents the average STCC GARCH pairwise pre and post shock portfolio conditional correlations for portfolios constructed from 
S&P500 and non S&P500 index constituents. These are reported separately for positive (+ shock) and negative shocks (- shock). Total, Retail, 
Stealth and Large presents model results separately for shocks to total, retail, stealth and large OFILst.  Pre shock cor is the average pairwise 
conditional correlation between portfolio p and the market portfolio prior to shocks to OFILst. Post shock cor is the average pairwise conditional 
correlation after shocks to OFILst. Δ cor is the average change in the post shock conditional correlation between the post shock and pre shock 
period. The t-test row presents the t-value associated with the test of whether the change in conditional correlation following a shock is significant 
at a 5% level. A + indicates that the average difference between the conditional correlation change following a positive shock is statistically 
different to the average change in conditional correlation following a negative shock at a 5% level using a t-test. % Δ cor is the percentage change 
in average conditional correlation that takes place after an order flow shock. The % Δ in cor<0 captures the proportion of negative changes in 
conditional correlation as a percentage of all changes following a shock. In Panel A all firms presents the results for the full sample while Panel B 
and Panel C partitions the sample according to whether the order imbalance  ratio of the portfolio in the pre-shock period was >1 or <1. Panel A 
presents results for portfolios constructed from S&P500 index constituents and from non S&P500 index constituents using STCC GARCH model 
shocks to total order flow. Panel B presents results for shocks to retail, stealth and large institutional order flow.   
 
             Panel A                          S&P500 Index Portfolios                              Non S&P500 Index Portfolios 
             +Total -Total +Total -Total 
 Pre shock cor  0.413 0.442 0.191 0.198 
 Post shock cor 0.326 0.335 0.154 0.138 
 Δ cor  -0.086 -0.107+ -0.037 -0.060+ 
 t-test -9.69 -23.44 -77.97 -14.82 
 % Δ in cor -20.07% -24.07% -19.37% -30.30% 
 % Δ in cor <0 63.84% 65.82% 59.58% 68.59% 
 
 
           Panel B                                                  S&P500 Index Portfolios                  
 
 +Retail -Retail  +Stealth -Stealth +Large -Large 
Pre shock cor  0.485 0.466 0.427 0.402 0.5125 0.5135 
Post shock cor 0.376 0.351 0.383 0.370 0.4669 0.4363 
Δ cor  -0.109 -0.115+ -0.044 -0.032+ -0.0456 -0.0772+ 
t-test -37.80 -30.31 -17.03 -11.85 -40.34 -57.03 
% Δ in cor -22.47% -24.68% -10.30% -7.96% -8.90% -15.03% 
% Δ in cor <0 55.5% 69.8% 62.4% 59.6% 54.3% 55.7% 
 
                                                                     
                                                                         Non S&P500 Index Portfolios 
 
 +Retail -Retail +Stealth -Stealth +Large -Large 
Pre shock cor  0.277 0.260 0.267 0.264 0.384 0.414 
Post shock cor 0.292 0.227 0.240 0.238 0.370 0.416 
Δ cor  0.015 -0.033+ -0.027 -0.026+ -0.014 0.002+ 
t-test 4.63 -24.12 -33.29 -35.99 -8.96 1.40 
% Δ in cor 5.56% -12.69% -10.11% -9.85% -3.65% 0.52% 











Table 6: Firm Characteristics and Sentiment Shocks.  
This table reports the coefficient values of the following regression in which the changes in order flow imbalance D-OFIL are 
regressed against a range of firm characteristics as shown below. 
D-OFILitm=β1+ β2SMBt + β3HMLt + β4UMDt + β5Sizeit+ β6ILLIQit+ β7Priceit + β8B/Mit + β9EPSit + β10EGit+ β11AGEit 
+ β12CMit + β13OWNit + β14INTit + β15S&Pit +  εit          
where D-OFILitm  is the change in the order flow imbalance (OFIL) of investor group m (total, retail, stealth or institutional) in 
month t for firm i. α is a constant. RMF is the market return in excess of the risk free rate, SMB is the small firm factor, HML is the 
book-to-market factor and  UMD is the momentum factor. Size, ILLIQ, PRICE, B/M, EPS, EG, AGE, CM, OWN, INT are all firm 
characteristics which may be associated with D-OFIL. These characteristics are Size(market value), ILLIQ (the Amihud illiquidity 
ratio), B/M(book-to-market ratio), Price(closing price), AGE(years listed on the exchange), CM(correlation between the daily 
return of stock i and the market), OWN(proportion of institutional ownership), INT(proportion of intangible assets to all assets), 
EPS (earnings to price ratio) and EG(earnings growth). We also include a dummy variable which has a value of unity if a firm is a 
S&P500 index constituent but has a value of zero otherwise (S&P).  
 
 All  Retail  Stealth  Large  
Variable + - + - + - + - 
 
Con 19.3747*** -19.4674*** 7.4425*** -8.1655*** 10.0398*** -9.8108*** 8.1107*** -4.5417*** 
SMB 0.0025 -0.0045*** 0.0000 0.0015 0.0023 -0.0027 -0.0014 -0.0013 
HML 0.0019 0.0025*** 0.0007 0.0007 -0.0012 -0.0031 -0.0005 -0.0002 
UMD -0.0020 0.0011 -0.0035*** 0.0016 0.0024 0.0000 0.0001 0.0018 
Size 0.0275 -0.0726 0.0602 0.0907 0.0120 -0.1149 -0.0656 -0.0874 
ILLIQ -0.0031 0.0454*** -0.0024 -0.0242*** -0.0202 0.0147 0.7785*** -3.8720*** 
Price -0.3250*** 0.6076*** -0.1852** -0.0130 0.0262 0.2501 0.0105 0.0436 
B/M -0.5618*** -0.0028 0.1641 0.1250 -0.2673 0.4208 -0.2045 0.3141 
EPS 0.5324*** -0.4572*** 0.1675*** -0.2413*** 0.3277*** -0.3919*** 0.0001*** 0.0000*** 
EG -0.5317*** -0.1089 -0.2749*** -0.0353 -1.2891 -2.0342 -0.3203*** -0.0649 
AGE -2.1112*** 2.4852*** -0.8319*** 0.5830*** -1.4683*** 1.6673*** -1.0918*** 0.4669** 
CM 0.0512 -0.7967 -0.6154 0.8505 0.0599 -0.3302 0.1745 -1.3808 
OWN  -0.7016*** 0.7972*** -0.4034*** 0.3127 -0.2647 0.3167 -0.2728 0.1508 
INT -1.1041*** 0.8714** -0.3012 0.4193 -0.1037 0.0713 -0.7122*** 0.5074 
SP dummy -0.0279 0.0958 0.6058 -0.2103 -0.7352 0.5320 -0.2110 -0.4314 
Adj R
2
 0.4130 0.4503 0.2676 0.3458 0.1212 0.3508 0.2888 0.3744 




















Table 7: Sub-period Analysis of Smooth Transition Results 
 
This table shows the average pairwise pre and post shock portfolio conditional correlation coefficient obtained from the STCC GARCH model for 
three separate sub-periods. These are reported separately for positive (+ shock) and negative shocks (- shock). Total, Retail, Stealth and Large  
presents model results separately for shocks to total, retail, stealth and large institutional order flow endogenously determined by the model.  Pre 
shock cor is the average pairwise conditional correlation prior to a shock, post shock cor is the average pairwise conditional correlation after a 
shock. Δ cor is the average change in the post shock conditional correlation between the post shock and pre shock period. A + indicates that the 
average difference between the conditional correlation change following a positive shock is statistically different to the change in conditional 
correlation following a negative shock at a 5% level using a t-test. The t-test row presents the t-value associated with the test of whether the 
change in conditional correlation following a shock is significant at a 5% level. % Δ cor is the percentage change in average conditional 
correlation that takes place after an order flow shock. The % Δ in cor<0 captures the proportion of negative changes in conditional correlation as a 








1993-2000 2001-2011  1993-2000  2001-2011  
  + - + - + - + - 
Pre shock cor  0.2318 0.2206 0.2418 0.2199 0.349 0.3076 0.3290 0.2665 
Post shock cor 0.1974 0.184 0.2269 0.1928 0.3104 0.2514 0.2983 0.2355 
Δ cor  -0.0344 -0.0366+ -0.0149 -0.0271+ -0.0386 -0.0562+ -0.0307 -0.0310 
t-test -32.48 -47.92 -11.92 -32.09 -29.28 -44.13 -14.83 -16.50 
% Δ in cor -14.84% -16.59% -6.16% -12.32% -11.06% -18.27% -9.33% -11.63% 
         
  Stealth    Large   
 
1993-2000 2001-2011 1993-2000 2001-2011  
  + - + - + - + - 
Pre shock cor  0.3104 0.3 0.3071 0.307 0.3819 0.3407 0.4092 0.332 
Post shock cor 0.2749 0.2556 0.29 0.2887 0.3551 0.2995 0.3804 0.3289 
Δ cor  -0.0355 -0.0444+ -0.0171 -0.0183+ -0.0268 -0.0412+ -0.0288 -0.0031+ 
t-test -21.35 -32.40 -12.10 -13.23 -11.97 -10.81 -16.40 -0.76 
% Δ in cor -11.44% -14.80% -5.57% -5.96% -7.02% -12.09% -7.04% -0.93% 
























Table 8: Analysis Using Different Return Frequencies 
 
This table shows the average pairwise pre and post shock portfolio conditional correlation coefficient obtained from the STCC GARCH model 
using three different return intervals. Two-day presents results using two-day return intervals, five day uses five day return intervals. These are 
reported separately for positive (+ shock) and negative shocks (- shock). Total, Retail, Stealth and Large  presents model results separately for 
shocks to total, retail, stealth and large institutional order flow endogenously determined by the model.  Pre shock cor is the average pairwise 
conditional correlation prior to a shock, post shock cor is the average pairwise conditional correlation after a shock. Δ cor is the average change in 
the post shock conditional correlation between the post shock and pre shock period. A + indicates that the average difference between the 
conditional correlation change following a positive shock is statistically different to the change in conditional correlation following a negative 
shock at a 5% level using a t-test. The t-test row presents the t-value associated with the test of whether the change in conditional correlation 
following a shock is significant at a 5% level. % Δ cor is the percentage change in average conditional correlation that takes place after an order 
flow shock.   
 
 Total   Retail    Stealth 
 
Large    
Two-day  +shock -shock +shock -shock +shock -shock +shock -shock 
Pre shock cor  0.2114 0.2426 0.3363 0.3088 0.3058 0.2870 0.3523 0.3523 
Post shock cor 0.1874 0.2192 0.3081 0.2633 0.2935 0.2678 0.357 0.2991 
Δ cor  -0.0240 -0.0234+ -0.0283 -0.0456+ -0.0124 -0.0193+ -0.0708 -0.0531+ 
t-test 30.55 30.35 23.14 33.57 9.42 18.38 41.75 19.58 
% Δ in cor -11.36% -9.66% -8.41% -14.75% -4.04% -6.71% -16.56% -15.08% 
 
                 
Five-day +shock -shock +shock -shock +shock -shock +shock -shock 
 
        Pre shock cor  0.2086 0.2222 0.3119 0.2855 0.3223 0.2942 0.3882 0.3487 
Post shock cor 0.2119 0.1954 0.2411 0.2530 0.3142 0.2943 0.3518 0.3256 
Δ cor  0.0034 -0.0269+ -0.0708 -0.0325+ -0.0081 0.0001+ -0.0364 -0.0231+ 
t-test -3.72 33.78 48.13 30.80 5.70 -0.05 16.87 9.67 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fig 1D: Order Flow Imbalance Over Time -Large 
